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Abstract. Several popular blockchains such as Ethereum execute com-
plex transactions through user-defined scripts. A block of the chain typi-
cally consists of multiple smart contract transactions (SCTs). To append
a block into the blockchain, a miner executes these SCTs. On receiving
this block, other nodes act as validators, who re-execute these SCTs as
part of the consensus protocol to validate the block. In Ethereum and
other blockchains that support cryptocurrencies, a miner gets an incen-
tive every time such a valid block is successfully added to the blockchain.
When executing SCTs sequentially, miners and validators fail to harness
the power of multiprocessing offered by the prevalence of multi-core pro-
cessors, thus degrading throughput. By leveraging multiple threads to ex-
ecute SCTs, we can achieve better efficiency and higher throughput. Re-
cently, Read-Write Software Transactional Memory Systems (RWSTMs)
were used for concurrent execution of SCTs. It is known that Object-
based STMs (OSTMs), using higher-level objects (such as hash-tables or
lists), achieve better throughput as compared to RWSTMs. Even greater
concurrency can be obtained using Multi-Version OSTMs (MVOSTMs),
which maintain multiple versions for each shared data-item as opposed
to Single-Version OSTMs (SVOSTMs).
This paper proposes an efficient framework to execute SCTs concurrently
based on object semantics, using optimistic SVOSTMs and MVOSTMs.
In our framework, a multi-threaded miner constructs a Block Graph
(BG), capturing the object-conflicts relations between SCTs, and stores
it in the block. Later, validators re-execute the same SCTs concurrently
and deterministically relying on this BG.
A malicious miner can modify the BG to harm the blockchain, e.g., to
cause double spending. To identify malicious miners, we propose Smart
Multi-threaded Validator (SMV). Experimental analysis shows that pro-
posed multi-threaded miner and validator achieve significant performance
gains over state-of-the-art SCT execution framework.
? This paper is eligible for Best Student Paper award as Parwat is full-time Ph.D.
student.
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1 Introduction
Blockchains like Bitcoin [18] and Ethereum [3] have become very popular. Due
to their usefulness, they are now considered for automating and securely storing
user records such as land sale documents, vehicle, and insurance records. Clients,
external users of the system, send requests to nodes to execute on the blockchain,
as smart contracts transactions (SCTs). An SCT is similar to the methods of
a class in an object-oriented langugage, which encode business logic relating to
the contract [5,9].
Blocks are added to the blockchain by block-creator nodes also known as
miners. A miner m packs some number of SCTs received from various (possibly
different) clients, to form a block B. Then, m executes the SCTs of the block
sequentially to obtain the final state of the blockchain, which it stores in the
block. To maintain the chain structure, m adds the hash of the previous block to
the current block B and proposes this new block to be added to the blockchain.
On receiving the block B, every other node acts as a validator. The validators
execute a global consensus protocol to decide the order of B in the blockchain. As
a part of the consensus protocol, validators validate the contents of B. They re-
execute all the SCTs of B sequentially to obtain the final state of the blockchain,
assuming that B will be added to the blockchain. If the computed final state
matches the one stored in B by the miner m then B is accepted by the valida-
tors. In this case, the miner m gets an incentive for adding B to the blockchain
(in Ethereum and other cryptocurrency-based blockchains). Otherwise, B is re-
jected, and m does not get any reward. Ethereum follows order-execute model
[6], as do several other blockchains such as Bitcoin [18], EOS [2].
Related Work: Dickerson et al. [9] observed that both miner and validators
can execute SCTs concurrently and harness the power of multi-core processors.
They observed another interesting advantage of concurrent execution of SCTs
in Ethereum, where only the miner receives an incentive for adding a valid block
while all the validators execute the SCTs in the block. Given a choice, it is
natural for a validator to pick a block that supports concurrent execution and
hence obtain higher throughput.
Concurrent execution of SCTs poses challenge. Consider a miner m that
executes the SCTs in a block concurrently. Later, a validator v may re-execute
same SCTs concurrently, in an order that may yield a different final state than
given by m in B. In this case, v incorrectly rejects the valid block B proposed
by m. We denote this as False Block Rejection (FBR), noting that FBR may
negate the benefits of concurrent execution.
Dickerson et al. [9] proposed a multi-threaded miner algorithm that is based
on a pessimistic Software Transactional Memory (STM) and uses locks for syn-
chronization between threads executing SCTs. To avoid FBR, the miner iden-
tifies the dependencies between SCTs in the block while executing them by
multiple threads. Two SCTs are dependent if they are conflicting, i.e., both of
them access the same data-item and at least one of them is a write. These depen-
dencies among SCTs are recorded in the block in form of a Block Graph (BG).
Two SCTs that have a path in the BG are dependent on each other and cannot
be executed concurrently. Later, a validator v relies on the BG to identify the
dependencies among the SCTs, and concurrently execute SCTs only if there is
no path between them in the BG. In the course of the execution by v, the size
of BG dynmically decreases and the dependencies change. Dickerson et al. [9]
use a fork-join approach to execute the SCTs, where a master thread allocates
SCTs without dependencies to different slave threads to execute.
Anjana et al. [7] used an optimistic Read-Write STM (RWSTM), which iden-
tifies the conflicts between SCTs using timestamps. Those are used by miner
threads to build the BG. A validator processes a block using BG in a completely
decentralized manner using multiple threads, unlike the centralized fork-join ap-
proach of [9]. Each validator thread identifies an independent SCT and executes
it concurrently with other threads. They showed that the decentralized approach
yields significant performances gain over fork-join [9].
Saraph and Herlihy [21] used a speculative bin approach to execute SCTs of
Ethereum in parallel. A miner maintains two bins for storing SCTs: concurrent
and sequential. The SCTs are sorted into these bins using read-write locks. The
concurrent bin stores non-conflicting SCTs while the sequential bin stores the
remaining SCTs. If an SCT Ti requests a lock held by an another SCT Tj then
Ti is rolled back and placed in the sequential bin. Otherwise, Ti is placed in
the concurrent bin. To save the cost of rollback and retries of SCTs, they have
used static conflict prediction which identifies conflicting SCTs before executing
them speculatively. The multi-threaded validator in this approach executes all
the SCTs of the concurrent bin concurrently and then executes the SCTs of
the sequential bin sequentially. We call this the Static Bin approach. Zhang
and Zhang [24] used multi-version timestamp order (MVTO) for the concurrent
execution of SCTs, in a pessimistic manner.
Exploiting Object-Based Semantics: The STM-based solution of Anjana
et al. [7] and others [24], rely on read-write conflicts (rwconflicts) for synchro-
nization. In contrast, object-based STMs (OSTMs) track higher-level, more ad-
vanced conflicts between operations like insert, delete, lookup on a hash-table,
enqueue/dequeue on queues, push/pop on the stack [12,13,20]. It has been shown
in literature that OSTMs provide greater concurrency than RWSTMs (see Fig. 5
in Appendix A). This observation is important since Solidity [5], the langugage
used for writing SCTs for Ethereum, extensively uses a hash-table structure
called mapping. This indicates that a hash-table based OSTM is a natural can-
didate for concurrent execution of these SCTs.1
The lock-based solution proposed by Dickerson et al. [9] used abstract locks
on hash-table keys, exploiting the object-based semantics with locks. In this
1 For clarity, we denote smart contract transactions as SCTs and an STM transaction
as a transaction in the paper.
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Fig. 1: (a) demonstrates two transactions T1 and T2. Between two get balance() (or
get()) of T1 on account A1 and A2 (initially both accounts maintain $10 in each), T2
sends money from account A1 to A2. Thus, T1 gets older balance for A1 while newer
balance of A2. Hence, it cannot be serialized [19] (or opaque [10]). The corresponding
conflict-graph has a cycle as shown in (c). To ensure the correctness, SVOSTMs abort
T1. (b) shows the execution using MVOSTM under the same scenario as (a). By main-
taining multiple versions, MVOSTM allows transaction T1 to get the older balance for
both accounts A1 and A2. Hence, for this execution the equivalent serial schedule is
T1T2 as shown in (d).
paper, we want to exploit the object semantics of hash-tables using optimistic
STMs to improve the performance obtained.
To capture the dependencies between the SCTs in a block, miner threads
construct the BG concurrently and append it to the block. The dependencies
between the transactions are given by the object-conflicts (oconflicts) (as opposed
to rwconflicts) which ensure that the execution is correct, i.e., satisfies conflict-
opacity [20]. It has been shown [12,13,20] that there are fewer oconflicts than
rwconflicts. Since there are fewer oconflicts, the BG has fewer edges which in
turn, allows validators to execute more SCTs concurrently. This also reduces the
size of the BG leading to a smaller communication cost.
Multi-version object STMs (MVOSTMs) [16] demonstrate that by main-
taining multiple versions for each shared data-item (object), even greater con-
currency can be obtained as compared to traditional single-version OSTMs
(SVOSTMs). Fig. 1 illustrates the benefits of concurrent execution of SCTs
by miner using MVOSTM over SVOSTM. Thus a BG based on MVOSTM will
have fewer edges than an SVOSTM-based BG, and will further reduce the size
of the BG stored in the block. These advantages motivated us to use MVOSTMs
for concurrent execution of SCTs by miners.
Concurrent executions of SCTs may cause inconsistent behaviors such as
infinite loops, divide by zero, crash failures. Some of these behaviors, such as
crash failures can be mitigated when SCTs are executed in a controlled environ-
ment, for example, the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [3]. However, not all
anomalies such as infinite loop can be prevented by the virtual machine. The
inconsistent executions can be prevented by ensuring that the executions pro-
duced by the STM system are opaque [10] or one of its variants such as co-opacity
[20]. Our MVOSTM satisfies the former condition, opacity, while our SVOSTM
satisfies the latter one, co-opacity.
Handling a Malicious Miner: A drawback of some of the approaches men-
tioned above is that a malicious miner can make the final state of the blockchain
be inconsistent. In the BG approach, the miner proposes an incorrect BG which
does not include all necessary edges. With the bin-based approach, the miner
could place the conflicting transactions in the concurrent bin [21]. This can re-
sult in inconsistent states in the blockchain due to double spending, e.g., when
two concurrent transactions incorrectly transfer the same amount of money si-
multaneously from a source account to two different destination accounts. If a
malicious miner mm does not add an edge between these two transactions in the
BG [7] or put these two transactions in concurrent bin [21] then both SCTs can
execute concurrently by validators. Similarly, if a majority of validators accept
the block containing these two transactions, then the state of the blockchain be-
comes inconsistent. We denote this problem as edge missing BG (EMB) in the
case of the BG approach [7] and faulty bin (FBin) in the case of the bin-based
approach [21]. In Section 4, we show the effect of malicious miners (EMB or
FBin) through experiments on the blockchain system.
To handle EMB and FBin errors, the validator must reject a block when
edges are missing in the BG or when conflicting SCTs are in the concurrent bin.
Execution of such a graph or concurrent bin by the validator threads can lead to
an inconsistent state. To detect such an execution, the validator threads watch
and identify transactions performing conflicting access on the same data-items
while executing concurrently. In Section 3, we propose a Smart Multi-threaded
Validator (SMV) which uses counters to detect this condition and reject the
corresponding blocks.
Dickerson et al. [9] suggest a lock-based solution to handle EMB errors. The
miner generates and stores the lock profile required to execute the SCTs of a
block along with the BG. The validator then records a trace of the locks each of
its thread would have acquired, had it been executing speculatively independent
of the BG. The validator would then compare the lock profiles it generated with
the one provided by the miner present in the block. If the profiles are different
then the block is rejected. This check is in addition to the check of the final state
generated and the state in the block. This solution is effective in handling EMB
errors caused by malicious miners. However, it is lock-based and cannot be used
for preventing EMB issue in optimistic approaches such as [7]. The advantage
of our SMV solution is that it works well with both optimistic and lock-based
approaches.
Our Contributions: This paper develops an efficient object semantics frame-
work to execute SCTs concurrently by a miner using optimistic hash-table (both
single and multi-version) OSTM. We use two methodologies to re-execute the
SCTs concurrently by validators. In addition to the fork-join approach employed
by Dickerson et al. [9], we also use a decentralized approach [7] in which the val-
idator threads execute independent SCTs concurrently in a decentralized man-
ner. To handle EMB and FBin errors, we propose a decentralized Smart Multi-
threaded Validator. To summarize:
– We introduce an efficient object-based framework for the concurrent execu-
tion of SCTs by miners (Section 3.2). We propose a novel way to execute
the SCTs efficiently using optimistic SVOSTM by miner while ensuring co-
opacity [20]. To further increase concurrency, we propose a new way for
the execution of SCTs by the miner using optimistic MVOSTM [16] while
satisfying opacity [10].
– We propose the concurrent execution of SCTs by validators using BG given
by miner to avoid FBR error (Section 3.3). The validator executes the SCTs
using either fork-join or decentralized approaches.
– We propose a Smart Multi-threaded Validator to handle EMB and FBin
errors caused by malicious miners (Section 3.4).
– Extensive simulations (Section 4) show that concurrent execution of SCTs
by SVOSTM and MVOSTM miner provide an average speedup of 3.41×
and 3.91× over serial miner, respectively. SVOSTM and MVOSTM based
decentralized validator provide on average of 46.35× and 48.45× over serial
validator, respectively.
2 System Model
As in [11,17], we consider n threads, p1, . . . , pn in a system that access shared
data-items (or objects/keys) in a completely asynchronous fashion. We assume
that none of the threads/processes will crash or fail unexpectedly.
Events: A thread invokes the transactions and the transaction calls object level
(or higher-level) methods which internally invokes read/write atomic events on
the shared data-items to communicate with other threads. Method invocations
(or inv) and responses (or rsp) are also considered as events.
History: It is a sequence of invocations and responses of different transactional
methods. We consider sequential history in which invocation on each transac-
tional method follows the immediate matching response.
In this paper, we consider only well-formed histories in which a new trans-
action will not begin until the invocation of previous transaction has not been
committed or aborted.
Software Transactional Memory (STM): STM [17,22] is a convenient con-
current programming interface for a programmer to access the shared memory
using multiple threads. A typical STM works at lower-level (read-write) and ex-
ports following methods: (1) STM begin(): begins a transaction with unique id.
(2) STM read(k) (or r(k)): reads the value of data-item k from shared memory.
(3) STM write(k, v) (or w(k, v)): writes the value of data-item k as v in its local
log. (4) STM tryC(): validates the transaction. If all updates made by the trans-
action is consistent then the updates will be reflected onto shared memory and
transaction returns commit (or C). Otherwise, transaction returns abort (or A).
Transaction Ti starts with STM begin() and completes when any of its meth-
ods return abort (or A) or commit (or C). The STM read() and STM tryC()
methods may return A.
OSTMs export higher-level methods: (1) STM begin(): begins a transaction
with unique id. (2) STM lookup(k) (or l(k)): does a lookup on data-item k from
shared memory. (3) STM insert(k, v) (or i(k, v)): inserts the value of data-item
k as v in its local log. (4) STM delete(k) (or d(k)): deletes the data-item k. (5)
STM tryC(): validates the transaction. After successful validation, the actual ef-
fects of STM insert() and STM delete() will be visible in the shared memory and
transaction returns C. Otherwise, it will return A. We represent STM lookup(),
and STM delete() as return-value (rv) methods because both methods return
the value from hash-table. We represent STM insert(), and STM delete() as
update (upd) methods as on successful STM tryC() both methods update the
shared memory. Methods rv() and STM tryC () may return A. For a transaction
Ti, we denote all the objects accessed by its rvi() and updi() methods as rvSeti
and updSeti, respectively.
Valid and Legal History: If the successful rvj(k, v) (i.e., v 6= A) method of a
transaction Tj returns the value from any of previously committed transaction
Ti that has performed upd() on key k with value v then such rvj(k, v) method
is valid. If all the rv() methods of history H is valid then H is valid history [20].
If the successful rvj(k, v) (i.e., v 6= A) method of a transaction Tj returns
the value from previous closest committed transaction Ti that k ∈ updSeti (Ti
can also be T0) and updates the k with value v then such rvj(k, v) method is
legal. If all the rv() methods of history H is legal then H is legal history [20]. A
legal history is also valid history.
Two histories H and H′ are equivalent if they have the same set of events.
H and H′ are multi-version view equivalent [23, Chap. 5] if they are valid and
equivalent. H and H′ are view equivalent [23, Chap. 3] if they are legal and
equivalent. Additional definitions are in Appendix B.
3 Proposed Mechanism
This section describes our approach to the construction, data structures, and
methods of concurrent BG, concurrent execution of SCTs by multi-threaded
miner using optimistic object-based STMs, multi-threaded validator, and detec-
tion of a malicious miner.
3.1 The Block Graph
The multi-threaded miner executes the SCTs concurrently and stores the depen-
dencies among them in a BG. Each committed transaction corresponding to an
SCT is a vertex in the BG while edges capture the dependencies, based on the
STM protocol. Multi-threaded miner uses SVOSTM and MVOSTM to execute
the SCTs concurrently, using timestamps. The challenge here is to construct the
BG concurrently without missing any dependencies.
SVOSTM-based miner maintains three types of edges based on oconflicts
between the transactions. An edge Ti → Tj between two transaction is defined
when: (1) rvi(k, v) - STM tryCj() edge : if rvi(k, v) <H STM tryCj(), k ∈
updSet(Tj) and v 6= A; (2) STM tryCi() - rvj(k, v) edge : if STM tryCi() <H
rvj(k, v), k ∈ updSet(Ti) and v 6= A; (3) STM tryCi() - STM tryCj() edge :
if STM tryCi() <H STM tryCj() and (updSet(Ti) ∩ updSet(Tj) 6= ∅).
MVOSTM-based miner maintains two types of edges based on multi-version
oconflicts (mvoconflicts) [16]. (1) return value from (rvf) edge: if STM tryCi() <H
rvj(k, v), k ∈ updSet(Ti) and v 6= A then there exist an rvf edge from Ti to Tj ,
i.e., Ti → Tj ; (2) multi-version (mv) edge: consider a triplet, STM tryCi(), rvm(k, v),
STM tryCj() in which (updSet(Ti) ∩ updSet(Tj) ∩ rvSet(Tm) 6= ∅), (Ti and Tj
update the key k with value v and u respectively) and (u, v 6= A); then there are
two types of mv edge: (a) if STM tryCi() <H STM tryCj() then there exist
a mv edge from Tm to Tj . (b) if STM tryCj() <H STM tryCi() then there
exist a mv edge from Tj to Ti. We modified SVOSTM and MVOSTM to capture
oconflicts and mvoconflicts in the BG.
Data Structure for the Block Graph: We use adjacency lists to maintain
the BG(V,E). V is the set of vertices (or SCTs) stored as a vertex list and E
is the set of edges (conflicts between SCTs) stored as edge list. Two lock-free
methods build the BG (see details in Appendix C.1): addVertex() adds a vertex
and addEdge() adds an edge in BG. To execute the SCTs, validator threads use
three methods of block graph library: globalSearch() identifies the independent
vertex with indegree 0 to execute it concurrently, remExNode() decrements the
indegree of conflicting vertices and localSearch() identifies the independent vertex
in thread local.
3.2 Multi-threaded Miner
A miner m receives requests to execute SCTs from different clients. The miner
m then forms a block with several SCTs (the precise number of SCTs depend
on the blockchain), m execute these SCTs while executing the non-conflicting
SCTs concurrently to obtain the final state of the blockchain. Identifying the
non-conflicting SCTs statically is not straightforward because smart contracts
are written in a turing-complete language [9] (e.g., Solidity [5] for Ethereum).
We use optimistic STMs to execute the SCTs concurrently as in Anjana et al.
[7] but adapted to object-based STMs on hash-tables to identify the conflicts.
Algorithm 1 shows how SCTs are executed by an m threaded miner. The
input is an array of SCTs, sctList and a object-based STM, (SVOSTM or
MVOSTM). We assume that both libraries support the BG methods described
above. The multi-threaded miner uses a global index into the sctList gIndex
which is accessed by all the threads. A thread Thx first reads the current value
of gIndex into a local value curInd and increments gIndex atomically (Line 2).
Having obtained the current index in curInd, Thx gets the corresponding
SCT, curTrn from sctList[] (Line 4). Thx then begins a STM transaction cor-
responding to curTrn (Line 5). For every hash-table insert, delete and lookup
encountered while executing the scFun of curTrn, Thx invokes the correspond-
ing STM methods: STM lookup(), STM insert(), STM delete(), either on an
SVOSTM or on an MVOSTM. Otherwise, it executes the step normally. If any
of these steps fail, Thx begins a new STM transaction (Line 5) and re-executes
these steps.
Upon successful completion of transaction Ti, Thx creates a vertex node for
Ti in the block graph (Line 21). Then, Thx obtains the transactions (SCTs) with
Algorithm 1 Multi-threaded Miner(sctList[], STM): m threads concurrently
execute the SCTs from sctList with STMs.
1: procedure Multi-threaded Miner (sctList[], STM)
2: curInd = gIndex.get&Inc(); // Atomically read the index and increment it.
3: while (curInd < sctList.length) do // Execute until all SCTs have not been executed
4: curTrn = sctList[curInd]; // Get the current SCT to execute
5: Ti = STM begin(); // Begins a new transaction. Here i is unique id
6: for all (curStep ∈ curTrn.scFun) do // scFun is a list of steps
7: switch(curStep)
8: case lookup(k):
9: v ← STM lookup(k); // Lookup data-item k from a shared memory
10: if(v == A) then goto Line 5;end if break;
11: case insert(k, v): // Insert data-item k into Ti local memory with value v
12: STM insert(k, v); break;
13: case delete(k):
14: v ← STM delete(k); // Actual deletion of data-item k happens in STM tryC()
15: if(v == A) then goto Line 5; end if break;
16: default: Execute the step normally // Any step apart from lookup, insert, delete
17: endswitch
18: end for
19: v ← STM tryC(); // Try to commit the transaction Ti
20: if(v == A) then goto Line 5; end if
21: addVertex(i); // Create vertex node for Ti with scFun
22: BG(i, STMs); // Add the conflicts of Ti to block graph
23: curInd = gIndex.get&Inc(); // Atomically read the index and increment it.
24: end while
25: build-block(); // Here the miner builds the block.
26: end procedure
which Ti is conflicting from the OSTM, and adds the corresponding edges to the
BG (Line 22). Thx then gets the index of the next SCT to execute (Line 23).
An important step here is how the underlying OSTMs (either SVOSTM
or MVOSTM) maintain the conflicts among the transactions which is used by
Thx (see Appendix C.2). Both SVOSTM and the MVOSTM use timestamps to
identify the conflicts.
Once all the SCTs of sctList have been executed successfully and the BG
is constructed concurrently, it is stored in the proposed block. The miner then
stores the final state (FSm) of the blockchain (which is the state of all shared
data-items), resulting from the execution of SCTs of sctList in the block. The
miner then computes the operations related to the blockchain. For Ethereum,
this would constitute the hash of the previous block. Then the multi-threaded
miner proposes a block which consists of all the SCTs, BG, FSm of all the shared
data-items and hash of the previous block (Line 25). The block is then broadcast
to all the other nodes in the blockchain.
Appendix D proves the following theorems:
Theorem 1. The BG captures all the dependencies between the conflicting nodes.
Theorem 2. A history Hm generated by the multi-threaded miner with SVOSTM
satisfies co-opacity.
Theorem 3. A history Hm generated by multi-threaded miner with MVOSTM
satisfies opacity.
3.3 Multi-threaded Validator
The validator re-executes the SCTs deterministically relying on the BG provided
by the miner in the block. BG consists of dependency among the conflicting
SCTs and restrict validator threads to execute them serially to avoid the False
Block Rejection (FBR) error while non-conflicting SCTs execute concurrently
to obtain greater throughput. The validator uses globalSearch(), localSearch(),
and remExNode() methods of the BG library as described in Section 3.1.
After successful execution of the SCTs, validator threads compute the final
state (FSv) of the blockchain which is the state of all shared data items. If it
matches the final state FSm provided by the miner then the validator accepts
the block. If a majority of the validators accept the block, then it is added to
the blockchain. Detailed description appears in Appendix C.3.
Appendix D proves the following theorems:
Theorem 4. A history Hm generated by the multi-threaded miner with SVOSTM
and history Hv generated by a multi-threaded validator are view equivalent.
Theorem 5. A history Hm generated by the multi-threaded miner with MVOSTM
and history Hv generated by a multi-threaded validator are multi-version view
equivalent.
3.4 Detection of Malicious Miners by Smart Multi-threaded
Validator (SMV)
We propose a technique to handle edge missing BG (EMB) and Faulty Bin
(FBin) caused by the malicious miner as explained in Section 1. A malicious
miner mm can remove some edges from the BG and set the final state in the
block accordingly. A multi-threaded validator executes the SCTs concurrently
relying on the BG provided by the mm and results the same final state. Hence,
incorrectly accepts the block. Similarly, if a majority of the validators accept
the block then the state of the blockchain becomes inconsistent. For instance, a
double spending can be executed.
A similar inconsistency can be caused by a mm in bin-based approach: mm
can maliciously add conflicting SCTs to the concurrent bin resulting in FBin
error. This may cause multi-threaded validator v to access shared data items
concurrently leading to synchronization errors. To prevent this, the SMV checks
to see if two concurrent threads end up accessing the same shared data item
concurrently. If this situation is detected, then the miner is malicious.
To identify such situations, SMV uses counters, inspired by the basic times-
tamp ordering (BTO) protocol in databases [23, Chap. 4]. SMV keeps track of
each global data item that can be accessed across multiple transactions by dif-
ferent threads. Specifically, SMV maintains two global counters for each key of
hash-table (shared data item) k (a) k.gUC - global update counter (b) k.gLC
- global lookup counter. These respectively keep track of number of updates
and lookups that are concurrently performed by different threads on k. Both
counters are initially 0.
When an SMV thread Thx is executing an SCT Ti it maintains two local
variables corresponding to each global data item k which is accessible only by
Thx (c) k.lUCi - local update counter (d) k.lLCi - local lookup counter. These
respectively keep track of number of updates and lookups performed by Thx on
k while executing Ti. These counters are initialized to 0 before the start of Ti.
Having described the counters, we will explain the algorithm at a high level.
Suppose the next step to be performed by Thx is:
1. lookup(k): Thread Thx will check for equality of the local and global update
counters, i.e., (k.lUCi == k.gUC). If they are not same then SMV will
report the miner as malicious. Otherwise, (i) Thx will atomically increment
k.gLC. (ii) Thx will increment k.lLCi. (iii) Perform the lookup on the key
k from shared memory.
2. update(k, val): Here Thx wants to update (insert/delete) k with value val.
So, Thx will check for the equality of both global, local update and lookup
counters, i.e., (k.lUCi == k.gUC) and (k.lLCi == k.gLC). If they are not
same then SMV will report the miner as malicious. Otherwise, (i) Thx will
atomically increment k.gUC. (ii) Thx will increment k.lUCi. (iii) Perform
the update on the key k with value val on shared memory.
Once Ti terminates, Thx will atomically decrements k.gUC, k.gLC by the
value of k.lUCi, k.lLCi, respectively. Then Thx will reset k.lUCi, k.lLCi to 0.
The reason for performing these steps and the correctness of the algorithm
is as follows: if Thx is performing a lookup on k then no other thread should be
performing an update on k. Here, k.gUC represents the number of updates to
k currently executed by all the threads while k.lUCi represents the number of
updates to k on behalf of Ti by Thx. Thus the value of gUC should be same as
lUC. Otherwise, some other thread is also concurrently performing the updates
to k. Similarly, if Thx is performing an update on k, then no other thread should
be performing an update or lookup on k. This can be verified by checking if lLC,
lUC are respectively same as gLC, gUC.
Theorem 6. Smart Multi-threaded Validator rejects malicious blocks with BG
that allow concurrent execution of dependent SCTs.
The same SMV technique can be applied to identify the faulty bin error as
explained in Section 1. See Appendix C.4 for detailed description along with
the pseudo code of smart multi-threaded validator and Appendix D for proof of
Theorem 6.
4 Experimental Evaluation
The goal of this section is to demonstrates the performance gains by proposed
multi-threaded miner and validator against state-of-the-art miners and valida-
tors. To evaluate our approach, we considered Ethereum smart contracts. In
Ethereum blockchain, contracts are written in Solidity [5] language and are ex-
ecuted on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [3]. EVM does not support
multi-threading [3,9]. So, we converted the smart contracts of Ethereum as de-
scribed in Solidity documentation [5] into C++ multi-threaded contracts similar
to the approach of [7,9]. Then we integrated them into object-based STM frame-
work (SVOSTM and MVOSTM) for concurrent execution of SCTs by the miner.
We chose a diverse set of smart contracts described in Solidity documenta-
tion [5] as benchmarks to analyze the performance of our proposed approach
as was done in [7,9]. The selected benchmark contracts are (1) Coin: a finan-
cial contract, (2) Ballot : an electronic voting contract, (3) Simple Auction: an
auction contract, and (4) finally, a Mix contract: combination of three contracts
mentioned above in equal proportion in which block consists of multiple SCTs
belonging to different smart contracts and seems more realistic.
We compared the proposed SVOSTM and MVOSTM miner with state-of-
the-art multi-threaded: BTO [7], MVTO [7], Speculative Bin (or SpecBin) [21],
Static Bin (or StaticBin) [21], and Serial miner.2 We could not compare our work
with Dickerson et al. [9] as their source code is not available in public domain.
We converted the code of StaticBin and SpecBin [21] from Java to C++ for
comparing with our algorithms.
Concurrent execution of SCTs by the validator does not use any STM pro-
tocol; however it uses the BG provided by the multi-threaded miner, which does
use STM. To identify malicious miners and prevent any malicious block from
being added to the blockchain, we proposed Smart Multi-threaded Validator
(SMV) for SVOSTM, MVOSTM as SVOSTM SMV, MVOSTM SMV. Addi-
tionally, we proposed SMV for state-of-the-art validators as BTO SMV, MVTO
SMV, SpecBin SMV, and StaticBin SMV and analysed the performance.
Experimental Setup: The experimental system consists of two sockets, each
comprised of 14 cores 2.60 GHz Intel (R) Xeon (R) CPU E5-2690, and each core
supports 2 hardware threads. Thus the system supports a total of 56 hardware
threads. The machine runs Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS operating system and has 32GB
RAM.
To analyze the performance, we evaluated the speedup achieved by each
contract on two workloads. In the first workload (W1), the number of SCTs
varied from 50 to 300 while the number of threads fixed is at 50. The maximum
number of SCTs in a block of Ethereum is approximately 250 [4,9], but is growing
over time. In the second workload (W2), the number of threads varied from 10 to
60, while the number of SCTs is fixed at 100. The average number of SCTs in a
block of Ethereum is around 100 [4]. The hash-table size and shared data-items
are fixed to 30 and 500 respectively for both workloads. For accuracy, results
are averaged over 26 runs in which the first run is discarded and considered
as a warm-up run. The results of serial execution is treated as the baseline for
evaluating the speedup. This section describes the detailed analysis for the mix
contract and analysis of Coin, Ballot and Simple auction benchmark contracts
are in Appendix E.
Experimental Results: Fig. 2 (a) and Fig. 2 (b) show the speedup of MVOSTM,
SVOSTM, MVTO, BTO, SpecBin, and StaticBin miner over serial miner for mix
2 Code is available here: https://github.com/PDCRL/ObjSC
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Fig. 2: Multi-threaded and SMVs Speedup over Serial Miner and Validator for
Mix Contract on W1 and W2
contract on workloads W1 and W2, respectively.3 The average speedup achieved
by MVOSTM, SVOSTM, MVTO, BTO, SpecBin, and StaticBin miner over se-
rial miner is 3.91×, 3.41×, 1.98×, 1.5×, 3.02×, and 1.12×, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 2 (a), increasing the number of SCTs leads to high con-
tention (because shared data-items are fixed to 500). So the speedup of multi-
threaded miner reduces. MVOSTM and SVOSTM miners outperform SpecBin
miner because MVOSTM and SVOSTM miners use optimistic object-based
STMs to execute SCTs concurrently and construct the BG whereas SpecBin uses
locks to execute SCTs concurrently and constructs two bins using the pessimistic
approach. SpecBin miner does not release the locks until the construction of the
concurrent bin, which gives less concurrency. However, for the smaller numbers
of SCTs in a block, SpecBin is slightly better than MVOSTM and SVOSTM
miners, which can be observed in the Fig. 2 (a) at 50 SCTs. MVOSTM and
SVOSTM miners outperform MVTO and BTO miners because both of them
are consider rwconflicts. It can also be observed that MVOSTM miner outper-
forms all other STM miners as it has fewer conflicts, which gets reflected (see
Fig. 4) as the least number of dependencies in the BG as compared to other
STM miners. For the multi-version (MVOSTM and MVTO) miners, we did not
3 In the figures, legend items in bold.
limit the number of versions because the number of SCTs in a block is finite.
The speedup by StaticBin miner is worse than serial miner for more than 100
SCTs because it takes time for static conflict prediction before executing SCTs.
Fig. 2 (b) shows that speedup achieved by multi-threaded miner increases
while increasing the number of threads, limited by the number of hardware
threads available on the underlying experimental setup. Since, our system has
56 logical threads, the speedup decreases beyond 56 threads. MVOSTM miner
outperforms all other miners with similar reasoning, as explained for Fig. 2 (a).
Another observation is that when the number of threads is less, the serial miner
dominates BTO and MVTO miner due to the overhead of the STM system.
The average number of dependencies in BG by all the STM miners presented
in Fig. 4. It shows that BG constructed by the MVOSTM has the least number
of edges for all the contracts on both workloads. However, there is no BG for
bin-based approaches (both SpecBin and StaticBin). So, from the block size
perspective, bin-based approaches are efficient. But the speedup of the validator
obtained by the bin-based approaches is significantly lesser than STM validators.
Fig. 2 (c) and Fig. 2 (d) show the speedup of Smart Multi-threaded Validators
(SMVs) over serial validator on the workloads W1 and W2, respectively. The
average speedup achieved by MVOSTM, SVOSTM, MVTO, BTO, SpecBin,
and StaticBin decentralized SMVs are 48.45×, 46.35×, 43.89×, 41.44×, 5.39×,
and 4.81× over serial validator, respectively.
It can be observed that decentralized MVOSTM SMV is best among all
other STM validators due to fewer dependencies in the BG. Though the block
size is less in bin-based approaches as compared to STM based approaches due
to the absence of BG, however, STM validators outperform bin-based validators
because STM validators precisely determines the concurrent SCTs based on
BG. In contrast, bin-based validator gives less concurrency using a lock-based
pessimistic approach.
The speedup of SMV is significantly higher than multi-threaded miner be-
cause the miner has to execute the SCTs concurrently either using STMs (includ-
ing the retries of aborted transactions) and constructs the BG or prepare two
bins (concurrent and sequential bin using locks in SpecBin and static analysis
in StaticBin). On the other hand, the validator executes the SCTs concurrently
and deterministically relying on BG (without any retries) or bins provided by
miner.
A malicious miner may cause either EMB or FBin errors in a block. Fig. 3
illustrates the percentage of validators without SMV logic embedded, i.e., Non-
SMVs accepting a malicious block on workloads W1 and W2, respectively. Here,
we considered 50 validators and ran the experiments for the mix contract. The
Fig. 3 shows that less than 50% of validators (except bin-based NonSMV) ac-
cept a malicious block. However, SpecBin and StaticBin NonSMVs show more
than 50% acceptance of malicious blocks. Though, it is to be noted that the
acceptance of even a single malicious block result in the blockchain going into
inconsistent state.
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To solve this problem, we developed a Smart Multi-threaded Validator (SMV),
which identifies the malicious miner (described in Section 3.4). We prove that
the SMV detects malicious block with the help of counter and rejects it. In fact
all the validators shown in Fig. 2 (c) & (d) are SMV based. Another advantage
of SMV is that once it detects a malicious miner during the concurrent execution
of SCTs, it can immediately reject the block and need not execute the remaining
SCTs in the block thus saving time.
Appendix E presents additional experiments that cover the average number
of dependencies in the BG and additional space required to store the BG into
the block. In addition to W1 and W2, we consider a third workload, W3 in which
the number of shared data-items varied from 100 to 600 while the number of
threads, SCTs, and hash-table size is fixed to 50, 100, and 30, respectively. We
have shown that the performance of SMV validators for Mix contract on W3
and several other experiments for all the benchmarks. We compared the time
taken by the SMV and NonSMV. We analyzed the speedup of fork-join validator
for all the three workloads. We showed the actual time (microseconds) taken by
all the miners and validators on W1 for the aforementioned four smart contract
benchmarks in Tables 4 - 11.
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
This paper presents a framework for the concurrent execution of smart contracts
by miner and validator, which has achieved better performance using object se-
mantics. In blockchains that follow order-execute model [6] such as Ethereum [3],
Bitcoin [18], each Smart Contract Transaction (SCT) is executed in two different
contexts: first by the multi-threaded miner to propose a block and later by the
multi-threaded validator to verify the proposed block by the miner as part of
the consensus. To avoid FBR errors, the miner on concurrent execution of SCTs
capture the dependencies among them in the form of a BG as in [7,9]. The val-
idator then re-executes the SCTs concurrently while respecting the dependencies
recorded in the BG to avoid FBR errors.
The miner executes the SCTs concurrently using STMs that exploit the ob-
ject semantics: Single-Version Object-based STM (SVOSTM) and Multi-Version
Object-based STM (MVOSTM). The dependencies among the SCTs collected
during this execution are used by the miner threads to construct the BG con-
currently. Due to the use of object semantics, the number of edges in the BG is
smaller, which benefits both miners and validators by enabling them to execute
SCTs quickly in a concurrent setting.
Another interesting aspect that we considered in this paper is the issue of
malicious miners. Suppose that in the BG approach, a malicious miner proposes
an incorrect BG which does not have all the edges resulting in edge missing BG
(EMB) error. With the bin-based approach, the miner could place the conflict-
ing transactions in the concurrent bin [21] resulting in faulty bin (FBin) error.
To handle malicious miner, we have proposed a smart multi-threaded validator
(SMV) which can identify these errors and reject the corresponding blocks.
Proposed SVOSTM and MVOSTM miner achieve on average speedup of
3.41× and 3.91× over serial miner respectively. Proposed SVOSTM and MVOSTM
decentralized validator outperform with an average speedup of 46.35× and 48.45×
over serial validator, respectively on Ethereum smart contracts.
Future Directions: There are several directions for future work. A natural
question is whether the size of BG can become an overhead. Currently, the aver-
age number of SCTs in a block is ≈ 100 in Ethereum. So, storing BG inside the
block does not consume much space. The BG constructed by MVOSTMs has
fewer dependencies as compared with state-of-the-art SCT execution as shown
in Fig. 4. However, the number of SCTs in a block can increase over time and as
a result the BG size can grow, and storing it will consume more space. Hence,
constructing storage optimal BG is an interesting challenge. Or achieving the
concurrent execution of SCTs correctly without incurring any extra storage
overhead without compromising with the speedup will be another interesting
direction. So, a related relevant question is what the optimal storage required
for achieving the best possible speedup?
Another interesting research direction is optimizing power consumption. Nowa-
days, multi-core systems are ubiquitous while serial execution fails to harness the
power of multiple cores. So, as discussed in the paper concurrent execution of
SCTs by invoking multiple threads on a multi-core system ensures better per-
formance than serial. But, multi-threading on the multi-core system consumes
more power. Additional power is consumed by the multiple miner and validator
threads to propose and validate the blocks concurrently. Hence, we would like to
explore trade-off between harnessing the number of cores and power consump-
tion.
Finally, since Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [3] does not support multi-
threading, it is not possible to test the proposed approach on Ethereum. So,
another research direction is to design multi-threaded EVM. We plan to test
our proposed approach on other blockchains such as Bitcoin [18], EOS [2] which
follow the order-execute model and support multi-threading.
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Appendix
This section is organized as follows:
Section No. Section Name
Appendix A Advantage of OSTMs over RWSTMs
Appendix B Remaining System Model
Appendix C Detailed Proposed Mechanism
Appendix D Correctness of BG, Multi-threaded Miner and Validator
Appendix E Detailed Experimental Evaluation
A Advantage of OSTMs over RWSTMs
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Fig. 5: Advantage of OSTMs over RWSTMs on SCTs
We now illustrate the advantage of OSTMs over RWSTMs. Consider an
OSTM for hash-table which invokes the following methods: (1) STM begin(),
(2) STM lookup(k) (or l(k)), (3) STM insert(k, v) (or i(k, v)), (4) STM delete(k)
(or d(k)), and (5) STM tryC() explained in Section 2
Consider Fig. 5, which demonstrates the advantage of OSTMs over RWSTMs
while executing SCTs concurrently by multiple miner threads. Fig. 5 (a) shows
two transactions T1 and T2 in the form of a tree structure which is working on a
hash-table with B buckets. Fig. 5 (b) illustrates a bucket of the hash-table with
four accounts (shared data-items) A1, A2, A3 and A4 which are accessed by these
transactions. Accounts are stored in the form of a list. Thus to access account
A4, a thread has to accesses A1, A2, A3 before access it.
Suppose T1 wants to send $50 from account A1 to A3 and T2 wants to send
$70 from account A2 to A4. Before performing these transfers, the respective
SCTs verify that each account has sufficient balance. After checking, the SCT
T1 deletes $50 from A1 and adds it to A3. At a lower-level, these operations
involve reading and writing to both accounts A1 and A3. The execution is shown
in Fig. 5 (a) in form of a tree following the notation used by Weikum et al. [23,
Chap 6]. Here, level 0 (or L0) shows the operations as read and write while L1
shows higher-level operations insert, delete and lookup.
Consider the execution at L0 of Fig. 5 (a). The dotted red circles represent
conflicting operations: r2(A1) conflicts with w1(A1) while r1(A2) conflicts with
w2(A2). As a result, this execution cannot be serialized as we cannot find any
equivalent serial schedule because of cyclic conflict among T1 and T2 as shown
in Fig. 5 (c). Hence for serializability [19] (or opacity [10]) either T1 or T2 has to
abort. However, execution at level L1 depicts that both transactions are work-
ing on different accounts and the higher-level methods (insert and lookup) are
isolated. So, we can prune [23, Chap 6] this tree and isolate the transaction
executions [20] at the higher-level with equivalent serial schedule T1T2 or T2T1
as shown in Fig. 5 (d). Essentially not all the conflicts of lower-level or read-
write level matter at higher-level. In a typical execution, object-conflicts (or
oconflicts)) [20] are fewer than read-write conflicts (or rwconflicts). Therefore,
OSTMs provides greater concurrency while reducing the number of aborts than
RWSTMs.
B Remaining System Model
This section describes the remaining execution model and the notions of STMs
used in this paper.
History: It is a sequence of invocations and responses of different transactional
methods. In other words, a history [17,19] H is a sequence of events represented
as evts(H). H internally invokes multiple transactions by multiple threads con-
currently. Each transaction calls higher-level methods, and each method com-
prises of read/write events. Here, we consider sequential history in which invo-
cation on each transactional method follows the immediate matching response.
It helps to make each transactional method as an atomic event. We denote
the total order of the transactional method as <H , so history is represented as
〈evts(H), <H〉.
In this paper, we consider only well-formed histories in which a new trans-
action will not begin until the invocation of previous transaction has not been
committed or aborted. History H comprises of the set of transactions as txns(H).
The set of committed and aborted transactions in H is denoted as committed(H)
and aborted(H) respectively. So, the set of incomplete or live transactions in H
is represented as H.incomp = H.live = (txns(H)− committed(H)−aborted(H)).
Transaction Real-Time Order: Consider two transactions Ti, Tj ∈ txns(H),
if Ti terminates, i.e. either committed or aborted before STM beginj() of Tj
then Ti and Tj respects real-time [19] order represented as Ti ≺RTH Tj .
MVSR, VSR, and CSR: A history H is in Multi-Version View Serializable
(or MVSR) [23, Chap. 5], if there exists a serial history S such that S is multi-
version view equivalent to H. It keeps multiple versions with respect to each
key. A history H is in View Serializable (or VSR) [23, Chap. 3], if there exists a
serial history S such that S is view equivalent to H. It has shown that verifying
the membership of MVSR and VSR in the database is NP-Complete [19]. So,
researchers came across with an efficient equivalence notion which is Conflict
Serializable (or CSR) [23, Chap. 3]. It is a sub-class of VSR which uses conflict
graph characterization to verify the membership in polynomial time. A history
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Fig. 6: Construction of Block Graph
H is in CSR if there exists a serial history S such that S is conflict equivalent
to H.
Serializability and Opacity: Serializability[19] is a popular correctness criteria
in databases. But it considers only committed transactions. This property is not
suitable for STMs. Hence, Guerraoui and Kapalka propose a new correctness
criteria opacity [10] for STMs which considers aborted transactions along with
committed transactions as well. A history H is opaque [10,11], if there exist an
equivalent serial history S with (1) set of events in S and complete history of
H are same (2) S satisfies the properties of legal history and (3) The real-time
order of S and H are preserved.
Linearizability: A linearizable [15] history H has the following properties: (1)
In order to get a valid sequential history, the invocation and response events can
be reordered. (2) The obtained sequential history should satisfy the sequential
specification of the objects. (3) The real-time order should respect in sequential
reordering as in H.
Lock Freedom: It is a non-blocking progress property in which if multiple
threads are running for a sufficiently long time, then at least one of the threads
will always make progress. Lock-free [14] guarantees system-wide progress, but
individual threads may starve.
C Detailed Proposed Mechanism
This section describes the data structure and methods of concurrent BG in
Appendix C.1. Then we describe the data structure of SVOSTM and MVOSTM
in Appendix C.2. Later, we describes the execution of SCTs by Multi-threaded
Validator rely on the BG provided by the miner in Appendix C.3 and detection
of malicious miner by Smart Multi-threaded Validator in Appendix C.4.
C.1 Data Structure of the Block Graph
We use adjacency list to maintain the Block Graph BG(V,E) inspired from
[7,8]. Here V is the set of vertices (vrtNodes) is stored as a vertex list (vrtList).
Similarly E is the set of Edges (egNodes) is stored as edge list (egList or conflict
list) as shown in the Fig. 6 (a), both vrtList and egList store between the two
sentinel nodes Head(−∞) and Tail(+∞). Each vrtNode maintains a tuple: 〈ts,
scFun, indegree, egNext, vrtNext〉. Here, ts is the unique timestamp i of the
transaction Ti to which this node corresponds to. scFun is the smart contract
function executed by the transaction Ti which is stored in vrtNode. The number
of incoming edges to the transaction Ti, i.e. the number of transactions on which
Ti depends, is captured by indegree. Field egNext and vrtNext points the next
egNode and vrtNode in the egList and vrtList respectively.
Each egNode of Ti similarly maintains a tuple: 〈ts, vrtRef, egNext〉. Here,
ts stores the unique timestamp j of Tj which has an edge coming from Ti in
the graph. BG maintains the conflict edge from lower timestamp transaction to
higher timestamp transaction. This ensures that the block graph is acyclic. The
egNodes in egList are stored in increasing order of the ts. Field vrtRef is a vertex
reference pointer which points to its own vrtNode present in the vrtList. This
reference pointer helps to maintain the indegree count of vrtNode efficiently.
Fig. 6 (b) demonstrates the high level overview of BG which consist of three
transaction T1, T2 and T3. Here, T1, T2 are in conflict while T3 is independent.
The underlying representation of it illustrated in Fig. 6 (a). For each transactions
(T1, T2 and T3) there exists a vrtNode in the vrtList of BG along with their
conflicts. Since there is en edge from T1 to T2, an egNode corresponding to T2
is in the egList of T1. As mentioned earlier, the conflict edges go from lower
timestamp to higher timestamp to ensure acyclicity of the block graph. After
adding the egNode, the indegree of the vrtNode of T2 in the vrtList is incremented
as shown in Fig. 6 (a).
Block Graph Library Methods Accessed by Multi-threaded Miner:
Multi-threaded miner uses multiple threads to build the block graph. Specifically,
the multi-threaded miner uses two methods to build the block graph: addVertex()
and addEdge(). These two methods are lock-free [14]. Here, addVertex(i), as the
names suggests adds a vrtNode with ts = i for respective scFun to the vrtList
of the BG if such a vertex is not already present. This node is atomically added
to vrtList using CAS operations.
The addEdge(u, v) method creates an egNode for v in u’s vrtNode if it does
not already exist. First, it identifies the egNode in the egList of vrtNode. If
egNode does not exist then it creates the node and adds into the egList of
vrtNode atomically using CAS. The edges from u to v captures the conflicts
between these transactions. This implies that v is dependent on u and the scFun
of v has to be executed only after u’s execution.
Block Graph Library Methods Accessed by Multi-threaded Validator:
Multi-threaded validator uses multiple threads to re-executes the SCTs concur-
rently and deterministically with the help of BG given by the multi-threaded
miner. To execute the SCTs, validator threads use three methods of block graph
library: globalSearch(), remExNode() and localSearch(). First a validator thread
Thi invokes the globalSearch () method which searches for a vrtNode n in the
block graph having indegree 0 (i.e., source node). Such a node corresponds to a
SCT, which does not depend on other transactions and hence can be executed
independently without worrying about synchronization issues. On identifying n,
Thi atomically tries to claim it if not already claimed by some other thread. It
does this by performing a CAS operation on the indegree to -1. After successful
execution of scFun of n, Thi invokes remExNode method which decrements the
inedgree count for all the nodes which are have an incoming edge from n. This
list of nodes is maintained in the egList of n.
While decrementing the indegree count of conflicting nodes if the validator
thread Thi finds any other vrtNode with the indegree as 0 then it adds that
a reference to that node in its thread-local log thLogi. The thLogi is used for
optimization so that Thi needs not to search in the global BG to find the next
source node. If a reference to the source node exists in the local log of validator,
it is identified by the localSearch() method. Thi on identifying such a node n,
atomically claims n (if not already claimed by another thread). Then it executes
the scFun of n and then remExNode as explained above. A detailed description
of BG methods, along with pseudocode is as follows:
BG(vrtNode, STM): Miner builds a BG based on oconflict given by the STM
for all SCTs. BG takes the oconflict from the STM at Line 29 for vrtNode of
SCT. If Ti have a conflict with Tj then its adds both SCT vrtNode in the BG at
Line 32 and Line 33 using addVertex(). To maintain the dependency among the
SCT Ti and Tj , the conflict edge goes from lower timestamp transaction (Ti) to
higher timestamp transaction (Ti) to avoid the deadlock. It adds an edge using
addEdge() at Line 35 or Line 37.
Algorithm 2 BG(vrtNode, STM)
27: procedure BG(vrtNode, STM)
28: /*STM provides conflictList of committed transaction Ti*/
29: conflist = STM getConflictfList (vrtNode.tsi);
30: /*Ti Tj are in conflict and Tj exists in conflict list of Ti*/
31: for all (tsj ∈ conflist) do
32: addVertext (tsj);
33: addVertext (vrtNode.tsi);
34: if (tsj > vrtNode.tsi) then
35: addEdge (vrtNode.tsi, tsj);
36: else
37: addEdge (tsj , vrtNode.tsi);
38: end if
39: end for
40: end procedure
addVertext(tsi): This BG method is called by the multi-threaded miner. First, it
identifies the correct location of vrtNode for transaction Ti in the BG at Line 42.
If vrtNode is not exist in BG then it creates a vrtNode node of Ti at Line 44.
Finally, It adds the vrtNode of transaction Ti in the vrtList [] of BG atomically
at Line 45 with the help of compare and swap operation. If CAS fails then
addVertext() again identifies the location of vrtNode node in the vrtList [] with
the help of current vertex predecessor node (vrtpred) at Line 50. Eventually,
vrtNode will be the part of BG. This method of the BG is lock-free.
Algorithm 3 addVertext(tsi)
41: procedure addVertext(tsi)
42: Search 〈vrtPred, vrtCurr〉 of vrtNode of tsi in vrtList[] of BG;
43: if (vrtCurr .tsi 6= vrtNode.tsi) then
44: Create new BG Node (or vrtNode) of tsi in vrtList[];
45: if (vrtPred.vrtNext.CAS(vrtCurr , vrtNode)) then
46: /*vrtNode successfully added in vrtList[]*/
47: return〈Vertex added〉;
48: end if
49: /*Start with current vrtPred to search the new 〈vrtPred, vrtCurr〉*/
50: goto Line 42;
51: else
52: /*vrtNode is already exist in vrtList[]*/
53: return〈Vertex already exist〉;
54: end if
55: end procedure
addEdge(conflictNode1, conflictNode2): This BG method is called by the con-
current miner. First, It identifies the location of conflictNode2 in the egList []
of conflictNode1 at Line 57. If egNode of conflictNode2 is not part of BG then
it creates a egNode at Line 59. Atomically, it adds an egNode in the egList [] of
conflictNode1 with the help of CAS at Line 60. After successful addition of egN-
ode it increments the indegree atomically with the help of egNode.vrtRef pointer
to maintain the dependency of it at Line 61. If CAS fails than addEdge() again
identifies the location of egNode node in the egList [] with the help of current
edge predecessor node (egPred) at Line 66. Eventually, egNode will be the part
of BG. This method of the BG is lock-free.
Algorithm 4 addEdge(conflictNode1, conflictNode2)
56: procedure addEdge(conflictNode1, conflictNode2)
57: Search 〈egPred, egCurr〉 of conflictNode2 in egList[] of the conflictNode1 vertex in BG;
58: if (egCurr .tsi 6= conflictNode2.tsi) then
59: Create new BG Node (or egNode) in egList[];
60: if (egPred.egNext.CAS(egCurr , egNode)) then
61: Increment the indegree atomically of egNode.vrtRef in vrtList[];
62: /*conflictNode2 is successfully inserted*/
63: return〈Edge added〉;
64: end if
65: /*Start with current egPred to search the new 〈egPred, egCurr〉*/
66: goto Line 59;
67: else
68: /*conflictNode2 is already exist in egList[]*/
69: return〈Edge already present〉;
70: end if
71: end procedure
localSearch(thlogi): This BG method is called by the multi-threaded validator.
Validator thread identifies the source node in threads local log thLogi at Line 73.
If it finds any source node in thLogi then it claims that node and atomically sets
its indegree field to -1 so that no other multi-threaded validator threads claim
this node at Line 74. After claiming of source node it executes smart contract
function (associated with the identified source node) using executeScFun() at
Line 77.
globalSearch(BG): The multi-threaded validator calls this BG method. Validator
thread identifies the source node (with indegree 0) in BG at Line 86. If it finds
Algorithm 5 localSearch(thlogi)
72: procedure localSearch(thlogi)
73: Identify local log vertex(llV ertex) with indegree 0 in thLogi.
74: if (llV ertex.indegree.CAS(0, -1)) then
75: sctCount ← sctCount.get&Inc();
76: /*Concurrently execute SCT corresponds to llV ertex*/.
77: executeScFun(llV ertex.scFun).
78: return〈 llV ertex 〉;
79: else
80: return〈nil〉;
81: end if
82: end procedure
any source node in BG, then it claims that node and atomically sets its indegree
field to -1 so that no other multi-threaded validator threads claim this node
at Line 87. After claiming of source node it executes smart contract function
(associated with the identified source node) using executeScFun() at Line 90.
Algorithm 6 globalSearch(BG)
83: procedure globalSearch(BG)
84: vrtNode ← BG.vrtHead; /*Start from the Head of the list*/
85: /*Identify the vrtNode with indegree 0 in BG*/
86: while (vrtNode.vrtNext 6= BG.vrtTail) do
87: if (vrtNode.indegree.CAS(0, -1)) then
88: sctCount ← sctCount.get&Inc();
89: /*Concurrently execute SCT corresponds to Node*/.
90: executeScFun(vrtNode.scFun).
91: return〈vrtNode〉;
92: end if
93: vrtNode ← vrtNode.vrtNext;
94: end while
95: return〈nil〉;
96: end procedure
remExecNode(removeNode): This BG method is called by the multi-threaded
validator. It atomically decrements the indegree for each conflicting node of
source node with the help of vertex reference pointer (vrtRef ) at Line 99. vrtRef
pointer helps to decrement the indegree count of conflicting node efficiently be-
cause thread need not to travels from head of the vrtList [] to identify the vrtN-
ode node for decrementing the indegree of it. With the help of vrtRef, it directly
decrements the indegree of vrtNode. While decrementing the indegree of vrtNode
if it identifies the new source node than it keeps that node information in thread
local log thLogi at Line 101.
Algorithm 7 remExecNode(removeNode)
97: procedure remExecNode(removeNode)
98: while (removeNode.egNext 6= removeNode.eTail) do
99: Atomically decrement the indegree of conflicting node using removeNode.vrtRef pointer.
100: if (removeNode.vrtRef.indegree == 0) then
101: Add removeNode.vrtRef node into thLogi.
102: end if
103: removeNode ← removeNode.egNext.vrtRef ;
104: end while
105: return〈nil〉;
106: end procedure
executeScFun(scFun): It executes the SCTs concurrently without the help of
concurrency control protocol. First, it identifies the smart contract function (sc-
Fun) steps and executes them one after another at Line 109. If the current step
(curStep) is lookup on key k, then it lookup the shared data item for key k
from the shared memory at Line 112. If curStep is insert on key k with value
as v, then it inserts the shared data item of key k with value v in the shared
memory at Line 114. If curStep is delete on key k, then it deletes the shared
data item of key k from the shared memory at Line 116. All these curStep of
scFun can run concurrently with the other validator threads because only non-
conflicting transactions will execute concurrently with the help of BG given by
the multi-threaded miner.
Algorithm 8 executeScFun(scFun)
107: procedure executeScFun(scFun)
108: while (scFun.steps.hasNext()) do /*scFun is a list of steps*/
109: curStep = scFun.steps.next(). /*Get next step to execute*/
110: switch (curStep) do
111: case lookup(k):
112: Lookup k from a shared memory.
113: case insert(k, v):
114: Insert k in shared memory with value v.
115: case delete(k):
116: Delete k from shared memory.
117: case default: curStep is not lookup, insert and delete;
118: end while
119: return 〈void〉
120: end procedure
C.2 Data Structure of SVOSTM and MVOSTM
This subsection describes the internal details about the data structure used to
store shared data items in SVOSTM and MVOSTM.
As shown in Fig. 5 (b) of Appendix A, we have used a hash-table with a fixed
size of buckets, where each bucket consists of a list of corresponding shared data
items. The data structure used to store the data items depends on the protocol
(SVOSTM, MVOSTM).
Data Structure of SVOSTM: Fig. 7 (a) demonstrates the structure of a
shared data item in SVOSTM. Each shared data item consist of eight fields
〈Account, val, Lock,maxL, maxU , cLlist[], cUlist[], next〉. Where Account is a
unique identifier which represents the shared data item or key or account (e.g.,
A1), val field stores the value corresponding to data item. Lock is use to pro-
vide synchronization among the operations of different transactions working on
same data items. Lock is acquired by the transaction before updating (insert-
ing/deleting) the shared data item and released after the successful execution.
Next two fields, i.e., maxL and maxU are counter variable
initialize as 0. Whenever a transaction performs any operation (STM lookup()/
STM insert()/ STM delete()) on the shared data item, they update the corre-
sponding value of the maxL/maxU . If current value of maxL/maxU is smaller than
the timestamp of the transaction i then it updates maxL/maxU with the i. Oth-
erwise, transaction with timestamp i returns abort and retry again. Field cLlist[]
and cUlist[] store the timestamp of all committed transactions (transaction ids)
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Fig. 7: Underlying Data Structure of Shared Data Items in SVOSTM
who has performed the STM lookup() and update operations (STM insert()/
STM delete()) on the shared data item respectively. These fields are used to
generate the conflicts (dependencies) between the transactions. Finally, the next
field is point to the next shared data item in the list of the respective bucket.
The shared data item in the list of the corresponding bucket is stored in the
increasing order of the keys.
To understand conflicts generation for concurrent execution of SCTs in SVOSTM,
we consider three transactions T0, T5, and T7. In SVOSTM, a transaction Ti
conflict with transaction Tj , if both are accessing a common data item k and at
least one of them is update operation (insert or delete). The conflicts of SVOSTM
is defined in Section 3.1.
Fig. 7 (b) shows the timeline view and respective operations of these trans-
actions. Here, T0 performed insert operation on shared data item as account A1
with value v0 (i.e., i0〈A1, v0〉), and committed successfully. Therefore, the times-
tamp (ts) of T0 is inserted in cUlist[] as shown in Fig. 7 (a). Similarly, T5, and T7
are two concurrent execution performing insert (i.e., i5〈A1, v5〉) and lookup (i.e.,
l7〈A1, v5〉) operation respectively. Since T5 performed insert on account A1, the
maxU field is set to 5 and later it committed successfully so its transaction id T5
is inserted in cUlist[]. Further, T7 performed lookup on A1 so maxL field is set
to 7 and committed successfully so its transaction id T7 is inserted in cLlist[].
Fig. 7 (c) illustrates the transactions conflict list. As shown in the concurrent
execution, T0 is the first transaction, so it does not find any conflict with other
transactions; hence, its conflict list is empty. Later, T5 committed, so T5 conflict
list consists of T0 since both T0 and T5 performed update operation on A1. A
transaction which performs update operation (insert or delete) conflicts with all
the transactions present in both cUlist[] and cLlist[] lists corresponding to shared
data item. At the commit time of T5, cLlist[] was empty so, T5 conflicts with T0
only. Finally, transaction T7 committed with the lookup on A1. A transaction
which performs lookup operation, conflicts with all the transactions present in
the cUlist[] list. So, T7 conflict list consists all the transactions present in cUlist[]
which is T0 and T5. Hence, T7 conflicts with T0 and T5.
Data Structure of MVOSTM: SVOSTM stores only one version correspond-
ing to each data item; however, MVOSTM maintains multiple versions. In the
proposed framework, we have a fixed number of SCTs in each block, so we do
not restrict the number of versions with each shared data item. Fig. 8 (a) shows
the data structure used to store the shared data item in MVOSTM protocol.
Here, each shared data item consists of four fields as 〈Account, Lock, vl, next〉.
Where Account, Lock, and next field are same as defined earlier for SVOSTM.
A new field vl stands for version list, which maintains version created by update
operations (insert and delete) on the shared data item.
To store the versions of the shared data item, we used a list (version list or vl).
Here, each entry of the version list consists of five fields 〈ts, val,maxL, rvl, vNext〉.
It stores the version in increasing order of transaction’s timestamps. The first
field ts shows the timestamp of the transaction which created this version (see
Fig. 8 (a)). The next field is val, which stores the value corresponding to that
version. Field maxL is used to store the maximum id/ts of the transaction that
has performed lookup on this version. A transaction Ti looks up from the ver-
sion j such that j is largest version timestamp smaller than i. The rvl[] stands
for return value list, which stores the timestamp of the committed transactions
that have lookup from a particular version. Finally, the last field vNext is used
to store a pointer to the next available version in the version list. As Fig. 8 (a)
illustrates account A1 maintains of three versions as 0, 5, and 10. Version 0, 5,
and 10 is created by transaction T0, T5, and T10 respectively.
Consider Fig. 8 (b) to understand conflicts generation in MVOSTM, which
demonstrates the timeline view and respective operations of four transactions
T0, T5, T7, and T10. Here, transactions T0, T5, and T10 perform insert operation
while T7 performs a lookup on account A1. Due to insert operation by T0, T5,
and T10 three different versions of account A1 has been created, as shown in
Fig. 8 (a). Here, transaction T0 executed first, so it created version 0 and then
T5 performed insert operation (i5〈A1, v5〉); therefore version 5 is created. After
that T7 performed lookup on A1 which returns the value as v5 (i.e., l7〈A1, v5〉).
After the successful commit of T7, it inserts its ts 7 in maxL of version 5 as
shown in Fig. 8 (a). Here, transaction T10 began after the beginning of T7
and committed before T7 but still transaction T7 is allowed to commit. Due to
multiple versions, T7 finds the older value of A1 as v5 created by T5 and hence
not abort; otherwise, in SVOSTM transaction T7 has to return abort.
Fig. 8 (c) Illustrates the conflict list of transactions. Here, T0 is the first
transaction and created version 0 of A1, so it does not conflict with any other
transaction; hence, its conflict list is empty. Next, transaction T5, which created
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a new version of A1 and committed successfully, so T5 conflict list consists of
T0. So, while generating conflict list, for an update (insert or delete) operation
on account A1 transaction first checks if the rvl[] list is empty for the largest
version smaller than its ts (transaction ts), then if the list is empty it adds that
version ts in its conflict list otherwise adds all the ts in rvl[] list of that version.
For a lookup operation, a transaction adds the ts/id of the version which it has
looked up and also the next version in the version list (if available) in its conflict
list. Next is transaction T10 since it committed before T7, so in T10 conflict list,
T5 is added. The reason why only T5 and not T7, this is because rvl[] list consist
only committed transaction ts and at the time when T10 committed T7 was still
live and not yet committed so rvl[] of T5 was empty. Finally, T7 committed and
as it performed a lookup on account A1 from version 5, so it adds T5 and the
next version ts, which is T10 in its conflict list. Hence, T7 conflicts with T5 and
T10.
C.3 Multi-threaded Validator
Multi-threaded validator re-executes the SCTs concurrently and deterministi-
cally rely on the BG provided by the multi-threaded miner. To access the BG,
validator uses globalSearch(), localSearch(), and remExNode() methods of block
graph library. The descriptions of all these methods are given in Appendix C.1.
High level overview of Algorithm 9 shows the execution of SCTs by multi-
threaded validator with the help of BG. First, multiple validator threads con-
currently identify the source node (indegree 0) in the BG using globalSearch()
at Line 124. After identifying the source node, thread claims it (sets indegree to
-1) atomically so that other multi-threaded validator threads can not claim it.
Then it executes the scFun of SCT corresponding to the source node. After suc-
cessful execution of scFun, it decrements the indegree count of conflicting node
of source node using remExNode() at Line 125. While decrementing the indegree
of conflicting node validator thread checks if it found new source node then it
store that node in its thread local log thLog to execute next SCT at Line 127
efficiently.
Algorithm 9 Multi-threaded validator(sctList, BG): v threads concurrently and
deterministically executes the SCTs using BG.
121: procedure Multi-threaded validator(sctList, BG)
122: /*Execute until all the SCTs successfully completed*/
123: while (sctCount < size of(sctList)) do /*Initially, sctCount=0 to maintain count.*/
124: vrtNode = globalSearch(BG); /*Identify the source node (indegree 0) in the BG*/
125: remExecNode(vrtNode); /*Decrement the indegree of conflicting nodes*/
126: while (thLog 6= nil) do /*Identify source node in thread local log (thLog)*/
127: vrtNode = localSearch(thLog);
128: remExecNode(vrtNode);
129: end while
130: end while
131: end procedure
Finally, validator thread compares the FSm given by the multi-threaded
miner and FSv computed by itself corresponding to each shared data item. If
final state matches and proposed block reaches the global consensus, then it is
added into the blockchain and respective miner awarded with the incentive.
C.4 Detection of Malicious Miner by Smart Multi-threaded
Validator (SMV)
In this subsection, we propose a technique to detect malicious miner using Smart
Multi-threaded Validator.
As we have seen the functionality of multi-threaded validator in Appendix C.3,
it executes the SCTs concurrently rely on the BG provided by the multi-threaded
miner. Suppose the miner that produces a block is malicious and does not add
some edges to the BG. This can result in the blockchain systems entering incon-
sistent states due to double spend. We motivate this with an example. Consider
three bank accounts A,B,C maintained on the blockchain with the current
balance being $100 in each of them. Now consider two SCTs Ti, Tj which are
conflicting where (a) Ti transfers $50 from A to B; (b) Tj transfers $60 from
A to C. Considering the initial balance of $100 in A account, both transactions
cannot be executed.
If a malicious miner, say mm does not add an edge between these two trans-
actions in the BG then both these SCTs can execute concurrently by validators.
Then such execution could result in the final state with the balances in the
accounts A,B,C as 40, 150, 160 respectively or 50, 150, 160. As we can see,
neither of these final states can be obtained from any serial execution and are
not correct states. Suppose the miner mm stores 40, 150, 160 for A,B,C in the
final state, and a validator v on concurrent execution arrives at the same state.
Then, v will accept this block, which results in its state becoming inconsistent.
If the majority of validators similarly accept this block, then the state of the
blockchain essentially has become inconsistent. We denote this problem as edge
missing BG or EMB.
Counter Based Solution to Catch the Malicious Miner: So, to avoid this
issue, we propose a a Smart Multi-threaded Validator (SMV), which uses the
concept of counters and identifies the malicious behavior of miner and rejects
the proposed malicious block. Our algorithm is inspired by BTO in databases
[23, Chap. 4]. SMV keeps track of each global data item that can be accessed
across multiple transactions by different threads. Specifically, SMV maintains
two global counters for each key of hash-table (shared data item) k - (a) k.gUC
(b) k.gLC. These respectively keep track of number of updates and lookups
that are concurrently performed by different threads on k. Both these global
counters are initialized to 0.
When a SMV thread Thx is executing an SCT Ti then SMV similarly main-
tains two local variables corresponding to each global data item k which is ac-
cessible only by Thx - (c) k.lUCi (d) k.lLCi. These respectively keep track of
number of updates and lookups performed by Thx on k while executing Ti. These
counters are initialized to 0 before the start of Ti.
Having described the counters, we will explain the high level design of SMV
approach is shown in Algorithm 10. To access the BG, validator uses the block
graph library methods globalSearch(), localSearch(), and remExecNode() as ex-
plained in Appendix C.1. Internally they use the executeScFun() method to
execute the smart contract function (scFun). First, it identifies the scFun steps
and executes them one after another at Line 132.
If current step (curStep) is lookup (at Line 135) on shared data-item key
k then it checks the k.gUC counter value. If k.gUC counter value is not equal
to k.lLC at Line 136, that means another concurrent conflicting thread is also
working on the same key k, i.e., conflict edge among them are missing in BG
given by the miner. Then SMV reports the miner is malicious.
If k.gUC counter value is zero means equal to k.lLC then it atomically
increments the k.gLC counter of key k in shared memory at Line 137, so, any
other concurrent conflicting thread checks the value as non zero it will detect
the malicious miner. It also increments the local k.lLC value by one at Line 138.
Finally, validator thread lookups the key k from the shared memory and return
the value as v at Line 139.
If curStep is insert on key k with value as v (at Line 143) then before inserting
the key k with value v in the shared memory it checks both global counter values
(k.gLC == k.lLC) && (k.gUC == k.lUC) at Line 144. If anyone of the counter
value is not equal to corresponding to the local variable value, that means another
concurrent conflicting thread is also working on the same key k, i.e., conflict edge
among them is missing in BG given by the miner. Then SMV reports the miner
is malicious.
If both global counter value is equal to corresponding local variables value,
then it atomically increments the k.gUC counter of key k in shared memory at
Line 145, so, any other concurrent conflicting thread checks the value as non
zero it will detect the malicious miner. It also increments the local k.lUC value
by one at Line 146. Finally, validator thread inserts the key k with value v in
the shared memory at Line 147. Same things works if curStep is deleted on key
k at Line 151.
After successful execution of each scFun, thread atomically decrements k.gUC, k.gLC
by the value of k.lUCi, k.lLCi respectively at Line 163. Then thread will reset
k.lUCi, k.lLCi to 0. Thus with the help of counter, validator threads are able
to detect the malicious miner, and straightforward reject that block.
Algorithm 10 executeScFun (scFun): Execute the smart contract function
(scFun) with atomic global lookup/update counter. Initially, lookup counter
(k.gLC) and update counter (k.gUC) value is 0 corresponding to each shared
data-items key k. Each transaction maintains local k.lLCi and local k.lUCi as
0 in transaction local log, txLog corresponding to each key.
132: while (scFun.steps.hasNext()) do /*Assume that scFun is a list of steps*/
133: curStep = scFun.steps.next(); /*Get the next step to execute*/
134: switch (curStep) do
135: case lookup(k):
136: if (k.gUC == k.lLCi) then /*Check for update counter (uc) value*/
137: Atomically increment the lookup counter, k.gLC;
138: Increment k.lLCi by 1. /*Maintain k.lLCi in transaction local log txLog*/
139: Lookup k from a shared memory;
140: else
141: return 〈Miner is malicious〉;
142: end if
143: case insert(k, v):
144: if ((k.gLC == k.lLCi) && (k.gUC == k.lUCi)) then /*Check lookup/update counter
value*/
145: Atomically increment the update counter, k.gUC;
146: Increment k.lUCi by 1. /*Maintain k.lUCi in transaction local log txLog*/
147: Insert k in shared memory with value v;
148: else
149: return 〈Miner is malicious〉;
150: end if
151: case delete(k):
152: if ((k.gLC == k.lLCi) && (k.gUC == k.lUCi)) then /*Check lookup/update counter
value*/
153: Atomically increment the update counter, k.gUC;
154: Increment k.lUCi by 1. /*Maintain k.lUCi in transaction local log txLog*/
155: Delete k in shared memory.
156: else
157: return 〈Miner is malicious〉;
158: end if
159: case default:
160: curStep is not lookup, insert and delete;
161: execute curStep;
162: end while
163: Atomically decrement the k.gLC and k.gUC corresponding to each shared data-item key k.
D Correctness of BG, Multi-threaded Miner and
Validator
This section describes the proof of theorems stated for the correctness of BG,
multi-threaded miner, and validator in Section 3. In order to define the cor-
rectness of BG, we identify the linearization points (LPs) of each method as
follows:
1. addVertext(vrtNode): (vrtPred .vrtNext .CAS(vrtCurr , vrtNode)) in Line 45
is the LP point of addVertext() method if vrtNode is not exist in the BG. If
vrtNode exist in the BG then (vrtCurr .tsi 6= vrtNode.tsi) in Line 43 is the
LP point.
2. addEdge(conflictNode1, conflictNode2): (egPred .egNext .CAS(egCurr , eg-
Node)) in Line 60 is the LP point of addEdge() method if egNode is not exist
in the BG. If egNode is exist in the BG then (egCurr .tsi 6= conflictNode2.tsi)
in Line 58 is the LP point.
3. localSearch(thLog): (llV ertex.indegree.CAS(0, -1)) in Line 74 is the LP point
of localSearch() method.
4. globalSearch(BG): (vrtNode.indegree.CAS(0, -1)) in Line 87 is the LP point
of globalSearch() method.
5. remExecNode(removeNode): Line 99 is the LP point of remExecNode() method.
Theorem 7. The BG captures all the dependencies between the conflicting nodes.
Proof. Section 3.1 represents the construction of BG by multi-threaded miner
using SVOSTM and MVOSTM protocol. BG considers each committed SCT as
a vertex and edges (or dependencies) depends on the used STM protocols such
as SVOSTM and MVOSTM. So, the underlying STM protocol ensures that all
the dependencies have been covered correctly among the conflicting nodes of
BG. Hence, all the dependencies between the conflicting nodes are captured in
the BG.
Theorem 8. A history Hm generated by the multi-threaded miner with SVOSTM
satisfies co-opacity.
Proof. Multiple miner threads execute SCTs concurrently using SVOSTM and
generate a concurrent history Hm. The underlying SVOSTM protocol ensures
the correctness of concurrent execution of Hm. SVOSTM proves that any history
generated by it satisfies co-opacity [20]. So, implicitly SVOSTM proves that
the history Hm generated by multi-threaded miner using SVOSTM satisfies co-
opacity.
Theorem 9. A history Hm generated by a multi-threaded miner with MVOSTM
satisfies opacity.
Proof. In order to achieve the greater concurrency further, a multi-threaded
miner uses the MVOSTM protocol, which maintains multiple versions corre-
sponding to each shared data-item. MVOSTM ensures the correct concurrent
execution of the history Hm with the equivalent serial history Sm. Any history
generated by MVOSTM satisfies opacity [16]. So, implicitly MVOSTM proves
that the history Hm generated by multi-threaded miner using MVOSTM satisfies
opacity.
Theorem 10. A history Hm generated by the multi-threaded miner with SVOSTM
and history Hv generated by a multi-threaded validator are view equivalent.
Proof. Multi-threaded miner execute the SCTs concurrently using SVOSTM
protocol to propose a block and generates Hm along with BG. After that multi-
threaded miner broadcasts Hm and BG to multi-threaded validators to verify
the proposed block. Multi-threaded validator applies the topological sort on BG
and obtained an equivalent serial schedule Hv. Since BG constructed from Hm
while considering all the oconflicts and Hv obtained from the topological sort on
BG. So, Hv will be equivalent to Hm. Similarly, Hv will also follow the return
value from relation to Hm. Hence, Hv is legal. Since Hv and Hm, are equivalent
to each other, and Hv is legal. So, Hm and Hv are view equivalent.
Theorem 11. A history Hm generated by the multi-threaded miner with MVOSTM
and history Hv generated by a multi-threaded validator are multi-version view
equivalent.
Proof. Following the proof of Theorem 10, multi-threaded miner executes Hm
using MVOSTM and constructs the BG. MVOSTM maintains multiple-version
corresponding to each shared data-item while executing the SCTs by multi-
threaded miner. Later, multi-threaded validator obtained Hv by applying topo-
logical sort on BG given by miner. Since, Hv obtained from topological sort on
BG so, Hv will be equivalent to Hm. Similarly, BG maintains the return value
from relations of Hm. So, from MVOSTM protocol if Tj returns a value of the
method for shared data-item k say rvj(k) from Ti in Hm then Ti committed
before rvj(k) in Hv. Therefore, Hv is valid. Since Hv and Hm are equivalent to
each other and Hv is valid. So, Hm and Hv are multi-version view equivalent.
Theorem 12. Smart Multi-threaded Validator rejects malicious blocks with BG
that allow concurrent execution of dependent SCTs.
Proof. With the help of global counter Smart Multi-threaded Validator (SMV)
identifies the concurrent execution of dependent SCTs at Line 136, Line 144,
and Line 152 of Algorithm 10 and reject the malicious block. Detail description
of SMV is available in Appendix C.4. We have tested our proposed counter-
based approach with the existence of malicious block shown in Appendix E.
SMV straightforward reject the malicious block and notify to the other nodes
part of the network. Hence, SMV rejects malicious blocks with BG that allow
concurrent execution of dependent SCTs.
E Detailed Experimental Evaluation
This section presents a detailed description of the benchmark contracts that we
have considered in this paper. It also includes the additional experiments which
show the performance benefits of proposed multi-threaded miner and validator
over state-of-the-art miners and validators on various workloads. Along with
this, we proposed smart multi-threaded validator to identify malicious miners.
Smart Contracts: Clients (possibly different) send transactions to the miners
in the form of complex code known as smart contracts. It provides several com-
plex services such as managing the system state, ensuring rules, or credentials
checking of the parties involved. [9]. For better understanding, we have described
Coin, Ballot, Simple Auction Smart Contracts from Solidity documentation [5].
We consider one more smart contract as Mix Contract, which is the combination
of the three contracts as mentioned above in equal proportion and seems more
realistic.
(1) Coin Contract: It is a sub-currency contract which implements simplis-
tic form of a cryptocurrency and is used to transfer coins from one account
to another account using send(), or used to check the account balance using
get balance() function. Accounts (unique addresses in Ethereum) are shared ob-
jects. A conflict will occur when two or more transaction consists of at least one
common account, and one of them is updating the account balance.
Algorithm 11 shows the functionality of the coin contract, where mint(),
send(), and get balance() are the functions of the contract. These functions can
be called by the miners or through other contracts. It initialized by the con-
tract creator (or contract deployer) to a special public state variable minter
(Line 165). Accounts are identified by Solidity mapping data structure essen-
tially a 〈key-value〉 pair (Line 167), where a key is the unique Ethereum address
and value is unsigned integer depicts the coins (or balance) in respective account.
Initially, the contract deployer (aka minter) creates new coins and allocate it to
each receiver (Line 173).
Further, send() function is used to transfer the coin from the sender account
to the receiver account. The function ensures that the sender has sufficient bal-
ance in his account (Line 178). If sufficient balance found in the sender’s account,
the coin transferred from the sender account to the receiver account. By calling
get balance(), anyone can query the specific account balance (Line 183).
(2) Ballot Contract: This contract is used to organize electronic voting where
voters and proposals are the shared objects and stored at unique Ethereum
addresses. At the beginning of voting, the chairman of the ballot gives rights
to voters to vote. Later, voters either delegate their vote to other voter using
delegate() or directly vote to specific proposal using vote(). Voters are allowed
to delegate or vote only once per ballot. A conflict will occur when two or more
voters vote for the same proposal, or they delegate their votes to the same voter
simultaneously.
(3) Simple Auction Contract: In this contract, an auction is conducted where a
bidder places their bids. Here bidders, maxBid, maxBidder, and auction end time
are the shared object which can be accessed by multiple threads. The auction will
end when the bidding period (or end time) of the auction is over. The auction
end time is initialized at the beginning by the auction master. A bid() function
is used to bid the amount by a bidder for the auction. In the end, the bidder
with the highest bid amount will be the winner, and all other bidders amount is
then returned to them using withdraw(). A conflict will occur when more than
two bidders try to bid using bidPlusOne() at the same time.
Algorithm 11 Coin(): A sub-currency contract used to depict the simplest form
of a cryptocurrency.
164: procedure Coin()
165: address public minter;/*Minter is a unique public address*/
166: /*Map 〈key-value〉 pair of hash-table as 〈address-balance〉*/
167: mapping(address => uint) balances.
168: Constructor() public
169: minter = msg.sender. /*Set the sender as minter*/
170: function mint(address receiver, uint amount )
171: if (msg.sender == minter) then
172: /*Initially, add the balance into receiver account*/
173: balances[receiver] += amount.
174: end if
175: end function
176: function send(address receiver, uint amount)
177: /*Sender don’t have sufficient balance*/
178: if (balances[msg.sender] < amount) then return 〈fail〉;
179: end if
180: balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
181: balances[receiver] += amount;
182: end function
183: function get balance(address account)
184: return 〈balance〉;
185: end function
186: end procedure
(4) Mix Contract: In this contract, aforementioned smart contracts are executed
simultaneously. This contract is designed to show real-time scenarios in which a
block consists of SCTs from different contracts. For the experiment, we combined
SCTs for three contracts in a block.
Performance Analysis: To analyze the proposed approach further, we show
the performance analysis on remaining benchmark contracts and workloads. Ad-
ditionally, we consider one more workload W3, in which the number of shared
objects (data-items) vary from 100 to 600, while threads, SCTs, and hash-table
size are fixed to 50, 100, and 30, respectively. For W3, with the increase in the
number of shared objects, contention will decrease.
In Fig. 9 to Fig. 11 numbering (a), (b), (c) show the multi-threaded miner
speedup over serial miner on W1, W2, and W3 for coin, ballot, and auction
contract respectively. Further, (d), (e), (f) shows the smart multi-threaded val-
idator speedup over serial validator on W1, W2, and W3 for the coin, ballot,
and auction contract respectively. It shows that the speedup decreases for multi-
threaded miner on W1; however, it increases on W2 on all benchmark contracts.
The observation for W1 and W2 are the same as explained in Section 4. Finally,
Fig. 12 (a) and Fig. 12 (b) shows the speedup for multi-threaded miner and SMV
for mix contract on workload W3.
For W3, as shown in Fig. 9 (c), Fig. 10 (c), Fig. 11 (c), and Fig. 12 (a)
the speedup increase for multi-threaded miner with increase in shared objects
(contention decreases). However in mix contract (as shown in Fig. 12 (a)) small
decrements for BTO and MVTO miner can be observed. Also, static bin miner
is performing worse than serial due to the overhead of static conflict prediction
before executing SCTs speculatively. Similarly Fig. 9 (f), Fig. 10 (f), Fig. 11 (f),
and Fig. 12 (b) shows the speedup achieve by SMV over serial validator on W3.
The speedup of bin-based SMV is less than STM validator. Thus for the better
visualization, we have shown speedup for STM validator on y1 axis whereas for
bin-based SMV on y2 axis. As we can observe, MVOSTM SMV outperforms all
other validators; however, performance decreases with increasing shared objects.
Dependencies in the BG: Fig. 13 to Fig. 15 shows the average dependencies
in the Block Graph (BG) generated by STM based multi-threaded miners for
the coin, ballot, and auction contract on all workloads. While Fig. 16.(a) shows
the average number of dependencies in the BG for mix contract on W3. There
is no BG in bin-based static bin and speculative bin miner; instead, there is
a sequential and concurrent bin. So from block size consideration, bin-based
approach is efficient, though, from validator speedup consideration, STM based
approach is better as shown in all smart multi-threaded validators figures.
As shown in figures for W1 with the increase in SCTs, the number of depen-
dencies increases in BG. However, for W2, there is no much variation since we
fixed the number of SCTs to 100 in W2. Moreover, the analysis of W3 is quite
impressive. Here for the ballot and mix contracts with the increase in shared
data items, the dependencies in BG increases for BTO and MVTO. However, it
decreases for SVOSTM and MVOSTM as shown in Fig. 14 (c). Also, for coin
contract, dependencies in BG decreases with an increase in shared data-item. In
the Auction contract, it depends on the highest bid; if the highest bid is bided
in the beginning, then there will be least dependencies in BG.
The average speedup (averaged across the workloads) achieved by the multi-
threaded miners and smart multi-threaded validators on workload W1, W2, and
W3 on all benchmarks are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. Note that
the average speedup result shown in Section 4 for mix contract is averaged on
workload W1 and W2.
Table 1: Overall Average Speedup on all Workloads by Multi-threaded Miner
over Serial
Multi-threaded Miner
Contract BTO
Miner
MVTO
Miner
SVOSTM
Miner
MVOSTM
Miner
SpecBin
Miner
StaticBin
Miner
Coin 1.596 1.959 4.391 5.572 1.279 6.689
Ballot 0.960 1.065 2.229 2.431 1.175 2.233
Auction 2.305 2.675 3.456 3.881 1.524 2.232
Mix 1.596 2.118 3.425 3.898 1.102 3.080
Total Avg. Speedup 1.61 1.95 3.38 3.95 1.27 3.56
Table 2: Overall Average Speedup on all Workloads by SMV over Serial
Smart Multi-threaded Validator (SMV)
Contract BTO
SMV
MVTO
SMV
SVOSTM
SMV
MVOSTM
SMV
SpecBin
SMV
StaticBin
SMV
Coin 26.576 28.635 30.344 32.864 5.296 7.565
Ballot 26.037 28.333 33.695 36.698 3.570 3.780
Auction 27.772 31.781 29.803 32.709 4.694 5.214
Mix 36.279 39.304 42.139 45.332 4.279 4.463
Total Avg. Speedup 29.17 32.01 34.00 36.90 4.46 5.26
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Fig. 9: Multi-threaded Miner and Smart Multi-threaded Validator Speedup Over
Serial Miner and Validator Across all Workloads for Coin Contract
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Fig. 10: Multi-threaded Miner and Smart Multi-threaded Validator Speedup
Over Serial Miner and Validator Across all Workloads for Ballot Contract
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Fig. 11: Multi-threaded Miner and Smart Multi-threaded Validator Speedup
Over Serial Miner and Validator Across all Workloads for Auction Contract
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Fig. 12: Multi-threaded Miner and Smart Multi-threaded Validator Speedup
Over Serial Miner and Validator on W3 for Mix Contract
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Fig. 13: Average Number of Dependencies in Block Graph for Coin Contract
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Fig. 14: Average Number of Dependencies in Block Graph for Ballot Contract
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
50 100 150 200 250 300
(a) STM Miner on W1
for Auction Contract
Auction Contract
Av
er
ag
e 
Nu
m
be
r o
f
D
ep
en
de
nc
ie
s 
in
 B
G
Number of SCTs
 
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
10 20 30 40 50 60
(b) STM Miner on W2
for Auction Contract
Auction Contract
Number of Threads
 
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
100 200 300 400 500 600
(c) STM Miner on W3
for Auction Contract
Auction Contract
Number of Shared Objects
 BTO BG MVTO BG  SVOSTM BG  MVOSTM BG
Fig. 15: Average Number of Dependencies in Block Graph for Auction Contract
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Fig. 16: Average Number of Dependencies in Block Graph and Percentage of
Average Multi-threaded Validator (NonSMV) Accepted a Malicious Block on
W3 for Mix Contract
Experiments on Malicious Miner: A multi-threaded validator determinis-
tically executes the SCTs rely on the BG provided by the miner in the block.
However, what if a miner is malicious and embeds an incorrect BG? To answer
this question, we have done experiments for the malicious miner. As explained
earlier, we proposed a Smart Multi-threaded Validator (SMV) to prevent such
malicious activity due to concurrent execution of SCTs of the block. This exper-
iment shows how many validators (NonSMV) accept malicious block proposed
by a malicious miner.
To obtain the malicious miner activity, we generate two SCTs of double-
spending (explained in Appendix C.4) in coin contract and ballot contract (dou-
ble voting: a voter votes two different proposals with one voting right). After
that, malicious miner added such SCTs into the block, manipulate the final state
accordingly, but did not add the respective dependencies in BG, i.e., for these
two SCTs, indegrees will be 0. Finally, malicious miner broadcast the malicious
block in the network. Then multi-threaded NonSMV validators re-executes the
SCTs concurrently using BG provided by the malicious miner. However, the val-
idators may execute double-spending SCTs concurrently and compute the same
final state as provided by the malicious miner. So, some of the validators accept
the malicious block. If they reach a consensus, then they will add this malicious
block into the blockchain. It may cause a severe issue in the blockchain.
Fig. 3, Fig. 16.(b), Fig. 17, and Fig. 18 demonstrates the average percentage
of validators accepting a malicious block on different workloads and benchmark
contracts. Here, we consider 50 validators and run the experiments for the Coin,
Ballot, and Mix contract. So, we can conclude that if the malicious miner is
present in the network, then some validators may agree on the malicious block,
and harm the blockchain. Therefore, we should ensure the rejection of such a
malicious block in the blockchain. To address this issue, we proposed Smart
Multi-threaded Validator (describe in Appendix C.4), which always detects the
malicious block at the time of concurrent execution of malicious SCTs (double-
spending and double voting) with the help of counter and straightforward reject
that block. Analysis of SMVs is presented for mix contract in Section 4 and
other contracts at the beginning of this section.
So, the next obvious question is, how much extra time does SMVs is taking to
serve the purpose of identifying the malicious miner over NonSMVs? We observe
that the counter-based multi-threaded validator (i.e., Smart Multi-threaded Val-
idator (SMV)) approach is giving a bit less speedup than without counter-based
multi-threaded validator (i.e., NonSMV) however this decrement in speedup is
very low on considered workloads. Instead of small decrement in speedup, it is
evident to use counter-based multi-threaded validators (SMVs) to preserve the
correctness of the blockchain.
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Fig. 17: Percentage of Average Multi-threaded Validator (NonSMV) Accepted a
Malicious Block for Coin Contract
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Fig. 18: Percentage of Average Multi-threaded Validator (NonSMV) Accepted a
Malicious Block for Ballot Contract
Experiments on Block Graph Size: We also measure the additional space
required to append the BG into the block. In Ethereum and Bitcoin average
block size is ≈ 20.98 [4] and ≈ 1123.34 KB [1] respectively for the interval of
1st Jan. 2019 to 8th March 2020, which is keep on increasing every year. The
average number of transactions in a block of Ethereum is ≈ 100 [4]. So, on an
average, each transaction requires 0.2 KB (≈ 200 bytes) in Ethereum. Based on
this simple calculation, we have computed block size with an increase in SCTs
per block for workload W1. To compute the block size Equation 1 is used.
B = 200 ∗NSCTs (1)
Where, B is block size in bytes, NSCTs number of smart contract transactions
(SCTs) in block, and 200 is the average size of an SCT in bytes.
We use adjacency list to maintain the Block Graph BG(V,E) inspired from
[7,8]. Here V is the set of vertices (vrtNodes) is stored as a vertex list, vrtList.
Similarly E is the set of Edges (egNodes) is stored as edge list (egList or conflict
list) as shown in the Fig. 6 (a) of Appendix C.1. Both vrtList and egList store
between the two sentinel nodes Head(−∞) and Tail(+∞). Each vrtNode main-
tains a tuple: 〈ts, scFun, indegree, egNext, vrtNext〉. Here, ts (an integer) is the
unique timestamp i of the transaction Ti to which this node corresponds to. sc-
Fun (an integer) is the ID of smart contract function executed by the transaction
Ti which is stored in vrtNode. The number of incoming edges to the transaction
Ti, i.e. the number of transactions on which Ti depends, is captured by indegree
(an integer). Field egNext (an address) and vrtNext (an address) points the next
egNode and vrtNode in the egList and vrtList respectively. So a vertex node Vs
size is 28 bytes in the experimental system, which is sum of the size of 3 integer
variables and 2 pointers.
Each egNode of Ti similarly maintains a tuple: 〈ts, vrtRef, egNext〉. Here,
ts (an integer) stores the unique timestamp j of Tj which has an edge coming
from Ti in the graph. BG maintains the conflict edge from lower timestamp
transaction to higher timestamp transaction. This ensures that the block graph
is acyclic. The egNodes in egList are stored in increasing order of the ts. Field
vrtRef (an address) is a vertex reference pointer which points to its own vrtNode
present in the vrtList. This reference pointer helps to maintain the indegree
count of vrtNode efficiently. The egNext (an address) is a pointer to next edge
node, so edge node Es requires a total of 20 bytes in the experimental system.
The experimental results on the percentage of additional space required to
store BG in the block are shown in Fig. 19 to Fig. 22 for all benchmark contracts
and workloads. The size of BG (β) in bytes is computed using Equation 2, while
to compute the percentage of additional space (βp) required to store BG in the
block is calculated using Equation 3.
β = (Vs ∗NSCTs) + (Es ∗Me) (2)
Where, β is size of Block Graph (BG) in bytes, Vs is size of a vertex node of BG
in bytes, NSCTs are number of smart contract transactions (SCTs) in a block,
Es is size of a edge node in bytes of BG, and Me is number of edges in BG.
βp = (β ∗ 100)/B (3)
As shown in Fig. 19 to Fig. 22, it can be observed that with an increase in
the number of dependencies, the space requirements also increase. The number
of dependencies in the Ballot contract (Fig. 14 (a)) for W1 is higher compared to
other contracts, so the space requirement is also high. In all the figures, the space
requirements of BG by MVOSTM, SVOSTM is smaller than MVTO and BTO
miner. The average space required for BG in % concerning block size is 14.24%,
14.95%, 21.20%, and 22.70% by MVOSTM, SVOSTM, MVTO, and BTO miner,
respectively on W1 (As shown in Table 3). Since the number of dependencies
in BG developed by MVOSTM is smaller than BG generated by other STM
protocols, so it requires less space to store BG. In the future, we are planning to
reduce space further to store the BG in the block by keeping the optimized or
compressed BG.
Table 3: On W1 Average % Increase in Block Size due to BG in Ethereum
Average % of Increase in Block Size due to BG on W1
Contract
BTO Miner MVTO Miner SVOSTM Miner MVOSTM Miner
Coin 14.225 13.702 13.712 13.220
Ballot 44.542 40.633 17.377 16.073
Auction 13.811 13.427 13.534 13.392
Mix 18.238 17.043 15.180 14.264
Total Avg. Change 22.70 21.20 14.95 14.24
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Fig. 19: Percentage of Additional Space Required to Store Block Graph (BG) in
Ethereum Block for Coin Contract
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Fig. 20: Percentage of Additional Space Required to Store Block Graph (BG) in
Ethereum Block for Ballot Contract
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Fig. 21: Percentage of Additional Space Required to Store Block Graph (BG) in
Ethereum Block for Auction Contract
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Fig. 22: Percentage of Additional Space Required to Store Block Graph (BG) in
Ethereum Block for Mix Contract
Performance Analysis of Decentralized NonSMV Validator: Fig. 23 and
Fig. 24 show the performance of Decentralized NonSMV validator. Here we can
observe that average speedup achieved by decentralized NonSMV validator is
slightly better than SMV including bin-based and fork-join validators. However,
NonSMV validators are prone to accepting a malicious block (the acceptance of
malicious block is shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 17, and Fig. 18).
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Fig. 23: Multi-threaded NonSMV Validator Speedup Over Serial Validator for
Coin and Ballot Contract
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Fig. 24: Multi-threaded NonSMV Validator Speedup Over Serial Validator for
Auction and Mix Contract
Performance Analysis of Fork-join SMV Validator: Fig. 25 and Fig. 26
show the performance of the fork-join validator [7,9]. Here we can observe that
the average speedup achieved by the fork-join validator is very less compared to
other SMV. The reason for low speedups by multi-threaded fork-join validators
is possibly due to the working of the master thread, which becomes slow to
allocate the SCTs to the slave threads and hence becomes the bottleneck.
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Fig. 25: Multi-threaded Fork-join Validator Speedup over Serial Validator for
Coin and Ballot Contract
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Fig. 26: Multi-threaded Fork-join Validator Speedup over Serial Validator for
Auction and Mix Contract
Time Taken by Multi-threaded Miner and SMV onWorkload-1 Bench-
mark Contracts: For the better clarity, we present the actual time taken by
the miner and validators on W1. Table 4 to Table 7 show the time taken by the
miners for all the four benchmark contracts, while Table 8 to Table 11 show the
time taken by the validators. The time shown in the table is in the microsecond
(µs) and averaged over 26 runs where the first run is considered as warm-up run
and discarded.
Table 4: Multi-threaded v/s Serial Miner Time on W1 for Coin Contract (in µs)
# SCTs Serial
BTO
Miner
MVTO
Miner
SVOSTM
Miner
MVOSTM
Miner
StaticBin
Miner
SpecBin
Miner
50 150.65 68.1112 50.3176 22.8232 14.9664 86.1328 12.7848
100 272.71 146.647 123.096 44.5568 37.464 159.595 33.1864
150 379.18 262.93 233.871 76.3768 55.584 271.694 49.1736
200 487.52 352.554 297.997 166.834 97.5192 527.921 72.2712
250 587.215 450.446 390.727 208.166 122.653 724.494 91.472
300 696.445 534.891 444.716 261.277 173.087 982.792 150.039
Table 5: Multi-threaded v/s Serial Miner Time on W1 for Ballot Contract (in
µs)
# SCTs Serial
BTO
Miner
MVTO
Miner
SVOSTM
Miner
MVOSTM
Miner
StaticBin
Miner
SpecBin
Miner
50 159.68 118.534 105.431 61.324 44.068 90.9888 35.4624
100 270.72 228.384 200.039 95.8848 86.2352 189.968 98.7128
150 426.24 425.461 357.151 171.871 162.211 424.124 181.074
200 524.64 656.821 723.909 264.23 274.261 674.95 310.022
250 633.32 897.225 919.69 338.452 410.184 846.106 423.346
300 775.96 955.438 1033.51 428.401 519.42 990.503 584.227
Table 6: Multi-threaded v/s Serial Miner Time on W1 for Auction Contract (in
µs)
# SCTs Serial
BTO
Miner
MVTO
Miner
SVOSTM
Miner
MVOSTM
Miner
StaticBin
Miner
SpecBin
Miner
50 106.8 18.0744 15.5328 14.3912 12.9552 45.8104 22.0304
100 239.04 86.7432 70.0488 45.6224 42.373 113.296 88.044
150 341.28 142.105 135.964 109.977 93.825 218.606 170.866
200 441.04 217.049 191.782 177.425 145.63 318.754 238.448
250 534.88 315.15 269.503 242.992 227.251 486.099 343.722
300 636.24 593.994 541.058 381.154 370.016 756.739 479.808
Table 7: Multi-threaded v/s Serial Miner Time on W1 for Mix Contract (in µs)
# SCTs Serial
BTO
Miner
MVTO
Miner
SVOSTM
Miner
MVOSTM
Miner
StaticBin
Miner
SpecBin
Miner
50 101.96 44.8776 31.352 21.5408 20.0272 69.6816 19.3464
100 192.2 92.4168 66.972 44.2504 38.2416 140.606 52.9
150 223.08 182.382 155.381 66.3584 56.3176 240.282 70.8464
200 318.04 286.35 221.89 94.5632 82.5976 330.153 97.808
250 421.32 418.263 319.533 141.498 123.091 421.934 172.095
300 515.56 505.855 477.872 177.78 152.14 615.446 212.537
Table 8: SMV v/s Serial Validator Time on W1 for Coin Contract (in µs)
# SCTs Serial
BTO
SMV
MVTO
SMV
SVOSTM
SMV
MVOSTM
SMV
StaticBin
SMV
SpecBin
SMV
50 141.63 4.9848 4.7008 4.5784 4.6784 22.4432 21.5008
100 263.4 8.936 8.1272 7.2896 6.8432 47.392 26.2848
150 359.83 12.2552 11.8888 10.7256 9.6768 74.6168 57.9472
200 438.83 14.7144 14.1384 12.6072 11.9136 83.0256 71.7624
250 562.24 19.4272 18.6376 16.6352 16.1696 112.474 78.2856
300 664.305 23.658 22.439 22.3 20.0271 145.223 127.9989
Table 9: SMV v/s Serial Validator Time on W1 for Ballot Contract (in µs)
# SCTs Serial
BTO
SMV
MVTO
SMV
SVOSTM
SMV
MVOSTM
SMV
StaticBin
SMV
SpecBin
SMV
50 156.24 5.2896 5.0248 4.2376 4.0416 26.564 30.776
100 289.8 10.484 9.8752 7.5848 6.3024 68.3032 63.1488
150 425.2 13.4 12.792 9.7368 9.62 112.822 120.214
200 516.84 16.2848 15.3904 13.1784 12.4192 155.313 147.697
250 627.2 21.5944 19.6976 16.4096 15.3408 254.764 232.866
300 757.8 25.1328 23.8872 19.332 19.0984 293.702 261.422
Table 10: SMV v/s Serial Validator Time on W1 for Auction Contract (in µs)
# SCTs Serial
BTO
SMV
MVTO
SMV
SVOSTM
SMV
MVOSTM
SMV
StaticBin
SMV
SpecBin
SMV
50 103.4 3.2096 3.112 3.1424 3.1224 10.4136 8.6112
100 190.08 6.1088 5.2912 5.5608 5.2752 33.0736 30.668
150 290.6 9.916 8.0408 8.4984 7.9392 55.9136 48.576
200 406.48 12.4536 11.0552 11.324 10.8424 115.354 98.404
250 531.8 15.9936 14.2256 15.4752 13.8392 150.586 94.8384
300 606.4 19.048 16.0512 17.1448 15.1544 168.833 118.31
Table 11: SMV v/s Serial Validator Time on W1 for Mix Contract (in µs)
# SCTs Serial
BTO
SMV
MVTO
SMV
SVOSTM
SMV
MVOSTM
SMV
StaticBin
SMV
SpecBin
SMV
50 2.1936 2.0072 1.8232 1.7088 17.4024 16.3712 8.6112
100 4.1016 4.088 3.6 3.4512 31.7432 31.042 30.668
150 5.6592 4.812 4.7304 4.4384 58.816 42.975 48.576
200 7.3952 6.7504 6.224 6.0672 77.756 75.0021 98.404
250 9.4328 8.6696 8.0208 7.4904 94.9208 93.9526 94.8384
300 11.6016 10.5352 9.3392 8.9192 116.43 107.08 118.31
